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The rise of Communism in Western Europe in recent years
poses a significant challenge to both the West and the East.
This study examines aspects of the phenomenon of Eurocommunism
and its effect upon the NATO Alliance; presents the differing
nuances and significance of Eurocommunism; and offers an
historical overview of Eurocommunism and, specifically, the
Italian Communist Party (PCI) . A discussion of the Alliance
identifies recent important developments, the Italian con-
tribution to NATO, and the United States' interests in the
NATO Alliance. The military and defense policies of the
Italian Communist Party are discussed and the likelihood of
its attaining a position of power in a future government is
analyzed. The results of recent elections in Italy are
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In the past four years, the rise of Communism in Western
Europe has been of such significance as to pose a challenge
to both the West and the East. Wide ranging debate has
ensued both in Washington and in Moscow and much has been
written on the nature and ramifications of this manifestation
of West European Communism. What is Eurocommunism and how
valid a threat is it to the superpowers? Is there truly a
new brand of Communism, independent of the Soviet Union,
professing principles of democratic pluralism while denouncing
the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of "dictatorship of the prole-
tariat"? If Eurocommunism does exist - and there are journalists
and scholars who strongly deny such a concept - what does this
portend for the United States and the NATO Alliance?
The phenomenon of Eurocommunism, while attracting con-
siderable attention, continues to remain ambiguous due to its
geographic and political imprecision. The term carries various
interpretations ranging from "mythical," "confusing," "a
public relations label," to "democratic," "tolerant," and
"moderate." While not defining a finite concept or coherent
doctrine, Eurocommunism implies a trend or approach toward an
independent, pluralistic form of socialism. It professes a
respect for individual liberties and finds its roots in the
democratic nations of Western Europe.

Whatever adaptation analysts employ to aid in under-
standing this "new" form of Communism, it is evident that
a need exists to more fully comprehend this tendency in
Western Europe, not only for the foreign policy makers of
the United States, but also for the leaders of the Soviet
Union. In the event that a member nation of the NATO
Alliance should be confronted with a Communist-oriented
government either in its own country or in one of the others,
a potential exists for a disruption in the operations of the
Alliance. For this reason as well as other supporting
circumstances, it is imperative that the United States be
prepared for such a happening.
This study analyzes the phenomenon of Eurocommunism and
the implication that it could have for the NATO Alliance.
It is the hypothesis of this study that, if the Italian
Communist Party, as one of the Eurocommunist parties, were
to come to power in a future government, the ramifications
and effects upon the NATO Alliance would be detrimental to
the United States. To test and to prove this hypothesis,
various methods of analysis are employed, including des-
criptive-analytical discussions. To understand the overall
approach, a brief discussion on each chapter is offered.
The initial section of this study addresses the various
meanings and significance of Eurocommunism, presenting the
diverse interpretations of the trend, and discussing the
geographical, ideological and independence components.

Chapter III contains a historical overview of Euro-
communism, highlighting the significant events in the develop-
ment of the three Eurocommunist parties: the French Com-
munist Party (PCF) , the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and
the Italian Communist Party (PCI) . The study focuses upon
the Italian Communist Party throughout the remainder of the
work because of the significant size and strength of the PCI
and the active role of Italy in the NATO Alliance. A
Communist-dominated Italian government, whether in coalition
with another political party or on its own, would create
unique circumstances for the Alliance and its member nations.
Chapter IV discusses the NATO Alliance, describing the
current condition and the recent developments that have
occurred. The Italian contribution to NATO is presented,
in addition to United States' interests in and PCI defense
policies toward the Atlantic Alliance.
The likelihood of the Italian Communist Party rising to
power in a future government is analyzed in Chapter V.
Various aspects pertaining to domestic instability within
Italy are presented as indicators of the possibility of PCI
electoral success and governmental power. Analysis of the
1976 and 1979 national elections show interesting results
relative to the public appeal of the PCI
.
Chapter VI addresses the effects of Eurocommunism,
specifically Italian Communism, upon the NATO Alliance.
A spectral analysis shows varying degrees of impact upon the
Alliance and its member nations. Further, alternatives to

NATO are proposed as a means of dealing with Communists in
the government of a member nation of the Atlantic Alliance.
Chapter VII presents the conclusions, highlighting the
outcome of what the United States may expect in the event
the PCI gain positions of power in the government. The
various responses of the United States are discussed in
this concluding section.
This study has been aided by the guidance offered by
Dr. Jiri Valenta and Dr. David Burke, and, for their assis-
tance and valuable comments, the author is appreciative.
An excellent opportunity was afforded the author by way of
gaining insightful observations and opinions from national
experts at the Eurocommunism Conference held at the Naval
Postgraduate School in the Summer, 1978. Finally, an added
degree of appreciation is extended to Dr. Valenta for his
assistance in arranging for the author to personally inter-
view well-known authorities on the subject of Eurocommunism
on a visit to Washington, D.C. These experiences were most
beneficial in the development of this study.
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II. MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF EUROCOMMUNISM
Before one can fully comprehend and evaluate the impli-
cations of Eurocommunism upon NATO or U.S. /USSR relations,
it is necessary to define the term and to identify those
characteristics which distinguish this form of Communism
from that practiced by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU)
.
A. VARIATIONS IN MEANING
In an effort to present a more precise and complete
picture of what Eurocommunism really means, three approaches
have been pursued, each offering a variance in definition.
The view from the Western world differs from that of the
Eastern countries, which in turn is incongruent with the
Eurocommunists ' explanation of what they represent. Each
sector poses interesting, thought-provoking aspects relevant
to its particular geopolitical and cultural environment.
From the Western viewpoint, the experts are divided as
to the mere existence of the tendency labeled Eurocommunism.
Michael Ledeen, one of the most notable and often critical
journalists, has voiced opposition frequently to those who
state that Eurocommunism is an impending third schism in the
world Communist movement. He cites as evidence supporting
his position the failure of the "eurocommunist" summit, held
in Madrid in March 19 77, to produce a joint statement demon-
strating cohesion among the three Communist Parties of Italy
11

(PCI) , France (PCF) and Spain (PCE) , known collectively as
the Eurocommunists . This lack of unity showed the absence of
a credible movement, especially in the area of human rights.
While James Goldsborough saw the Madrid summit as the primary
2force in legitimizing Eurocommunism, Ledeen noted that the
PCI, the PCF and the PCE agreed upon very little at the con-
ference and were completely unprepared to take a unified pub-
lic position on such an important issue as their relationship
with the Soviet Union and other European nations. Because
this lack of agreement, which carried over to other major
aspects as well, includes the integration of Europe, support
of the European Economic Community and the NATO Alliance, and
the overall absence of a common program, Ledeen adheres to
the theory that "there is no such thing as European Communism
or Eurocommunism. Rather, there exist various forms of
national Communism, which must be considered on a country-
3by-country basis, not as a unified effort."
Ledeen ' s views run counter to those of the former Secre-
tary of State, Henry Kissinger, who proclaimed that the
challenges posed by the West European Communist Parties do
not exist in isolation. Kissinger believes that a Communist
breakthrough to power or a share in power via a coalition
government in one country will have a significant psychologi-
cal effect on the others. Such success will make the Communist
Parties seem respectable or could suggest that the tide of




A well-known European political figure who shares the
theory of non-existence espoused by Ledeen is Jacques Chirac,
the Mayor of Paris and the President of the Gaullist Assembly
for the Republic (RPR) political party. Chirac notes that the
Eurocommunist parties would have to de-Stalinize themselves
as well as modify their internal governing procedure of
"democratic centralism" before being considered truly indepen-
dent, democratic movements. Additionally, the detachment from
Moscow necessary to prove their evolution has not occurred.
According to Chirac, "Eurocommunism is a bet that we are urged
to make on the capacity of Communists to change. As of now,
nothing allows us to place this bet without grave risks."
One can find views even further to the left when consider-
ing the phenomenon of Eurocommunism. As one author bluntly
stated, "The independence of European Communists is a myth;
when the chips are down their alliance with the USSR is
unshakable." The term Eurocommunism has been classified
as merely a catchword, labeling a pattern of tactical politi-
cal maneuvering by the French, Italian and Spanish Communist
Parties to show their distance from Moscow. Each has expressed
its "independence" in its own way, in order to improve its
image and election opportunities with the voters of the res-
pective countries.
From the positive aspect, that the trend does exist, Euro-
communism can take on various meanings and interpretations.
Pierre Hassner, an expert in West European political affairs,
offers one of the best analyses of this controversial term by
13

way of a three-fold definition. Taking the broadest view,
Eurocommunism could be considered any form of Communism which
expresses autonomy/independence from Moscow. Strictly
speaking, the Communist Parties of Romania, Yugoslavia,
Albania and even China and Japan would fall within this broad
definition. The converse, and narrowest definition, would
include only those parties working to create a socialist
Western Europe, united politically and demonstrating defense
autonomy. This view finds a link between the struggle for
democratic socialism and that for a united Europe. The
shared characteristics of the Eurocommunists have a priority
over and are stronger than the nationalistic features of each
country. Finally, the middle definition, which has become
the official one, accentuates programs and principles rather
than opposition to Moscow. It emphasizes a pluralistic ver-
sion of Communism, suited to developed/ industrialized socie-
ties. It asserts that, in such societies socialism is
inseparable from democracy, and it "pledges to maintain their
complex social structure and liberal traditions and institu-
tions not only on the road towards socialism but in socialist
Q
society itself." This definition appears to most clearly
define the trend.
The well-known expert in Soviet studies, Vernon Aspaturian
has offered four distinguishing characteristics which identify
"Eurocommunism". These characteristics highlight the primary
tenets of the concept and include:
14

(1) The organizational, tactical, and ideological
autonomy and independence of each Communist Party
in applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism.
(2) The renunciation of violent revolution, the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat, and the irreversibility
of Communist power as necessary elements in the crea-
tion of a socialist society. These are retrograded to
optional rather than inevitable or necessary modes.
(3) Permanent commitment to the values of Western
humanism, democratic values, and pluralism, i.e.
,
pledging to honor the institutions of free and uni-
versal suffrage, freedom of opinion, expression,
association, the right to strike, free movements of
people, etc.
(4) Altering the balance between internal and external
commitments in the search for a socialist and Communist
society, i.e.
,
giving higher priority to finding common
ground with domestic kindred anti-capitalist political
and social forces than to the preservation of common
ground with the U.S.S.R. This, of course, represents
a general trend in World Communism, whether in the U.S.S.R.,
Yugoslavia, China, ruling and non-ruling parties alike,
of giving increasingly greater priority to the interests
of domestic constituencies than to external constitu-
encies or higher ideological abstractions.
Aspects of these characteristics are evident in the writings
and addresses of the Eurocommunist leaders of the three West
European Communist Parties. Enrico Berlinguer of the PCI,
Georges Marchais, head of the PCF, and the leader of the
Spanish Communist Party (PCE) , Santiago Carrillo, have
affirmed their support for this autonomous form of Communism.
The most outspoken of the three leaders, the PCE ' s Carrillo,
wrote a book entitled Eurocommunism and the State . On the
mission of Eurocommunism, he states:
Eurocommunism must show that the victory of the
socialist forces in Western Europe will not multiply
Soviet power nor presuppose the extension of the one-
party Soviet model. It will be an independent experi-
ence with a more advanced socialism that will have a
positive influence on the democratic evolution of the
socialist models existing today.
15

Similarly, Enrico Berlinguer, the General Secretary of the
PCI, summarized the meaning of Eurocommunism at the Madrid
summit by offering the following explanation:
What is being called Eurocommunism is the fruit
of an elaboration that each of us has accomplished
separately, taking into account the conditions of
exploitation of the working class in each of our
countries and of the workers' interests, and con-
sidering also what the developed countries of Western
Europe have in common. It is not up to us to say
whether this elaboration will also have an influence
beyond Western Europe.
H
Berlinguer also defined Eurocommunism according to two cri-
teria: 1) the union between socialism and freedom and 2)
the effort to unite the workers' movement by bringing to-
gether European Socialists and Social Democrats. While the
basis for such criteria appears legitimate and the desired
results beneficial, the standards totally contradict the
PCF ' s campaign against the Socialist Party and the conflict
within the Union of the Left highlighting a Eurocommunist
disagreement.
The French Communist Party had a tradition of being
the most Stalinist of the three Eurocommunist parties. It is
also the least vocal in its declarations of independence.
Historically, the French have held nationalism in the highest
esteem and they are viewed with skepticism by the party elite
of the PCI and the PCE. However, Marchais pledged his sup-
port to Eurocommunism and following the Madrid summit took
strong exception to the headline of a "reactionary" French
newspaper which called Eurocommunism a farce. "It is not
13
a farce," stated Marchais. "It is something serious."
16

Eurocommunism is viewed by the countries of Eastern
Europe as very different from the dictatorial regimes under
which they live. It offers an encouraging source of ideo-
logical justification and political effectiveness in their
quest for increased independence from the USSR and the CPSU.
It is considered a viable alternative to Russian Communism.
In Eastern Europe there exist significant differences
between those who greet with enthusiasm the political
opportunities associated with Eurocommunism and those who
are apprehensive of its consequences. The Communist Parties
of Eastern Europe can be separated into three distinct
groups: the "autonomist" parties of Yugoslavia, Romania
and Albania, the "centrist" parties of Poland and Hungary,
and the "loyalist" parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and
14East Germany. As each label would indicate, the Eastern
European parties share differing relationships with the
Soviet Union and profess opinions relative to their
particular political standing in the world Communist move-
ment. Eurocommunism has stimulated a new and divisive
debate throughout the region. The supreme reaction of these
regimes to Eurocommunism will depend to a great extent on
the adjustments they make under changing social, economic
and political conditions within their countries and to a
lesser degree on the loyalists' ideological restraints.
There exists little consensus on the meaning of Euro-
communism. Each author in the field offers a variation in
definition and interpretation. Nevertheless, certain common
17

characteristics can be attributed to the term which describe
it with some degree of accuracy and acceptability. Euro-
communism is recognized as a democratic form of Communism
which is attempting to pursue an independent path toward
socialism, free of Soviet domination and oppression. While
lacking a precise concept or doctrine, Eurocommunism repre-
sents a trend toward a pluralistic socialism in the more
developed industrialized countries of Western Europe. With
this explanation as a basis for discussion, it is now useful
to learn more about these unique Communist Parties.
B. GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECT
"Eurocommunism", when addressed literally, implies only
that form of Communism practiced exclusively in Europe. As
Hassner and others have noted, Eurocommunism could be extended
to other nations of the world which profess independence
from the CPSU, such as Japan and Australia. However, the
roots of Eurocommunism lie in Western Europe, and specifically,
within the three largest nations of Southern Europe: Italy,
France and Spain. Certain conditions in these countries pro-
vide a favorable environment for the development of strong
Communist Parties. Such factors are not present in the coun-
tries of Northern Europe where, with the exception of Finland,
the Communist Parties are small and lack the political influ-
ence of the Latin countries to the South. Because of the
relatively egalitarian societies with strongly rooted Social
Democratic parties, there has been little appeal for the
18

Communist dogma and doctrines in countries such as The
Netherlands, Belgium, Iceland and Scandinavia.
The unique case of West Germany is interesting in that
the once strong Communist party has declined sharply in
recent years. During the 1920s, the Communist Party of
Germany (KPD) was not only the most aggressive Communist
party but also the largest in Western Europe. The decima-
tion of the party by Hitler was not followed by a rebirth
in the former Western occupation zones as was the case in
Italy. Between 1956 and 1968 the government outlawed as
unconstitutional the Communist Party of Germany. Since its
emergence with a new name, the German Communist Party (DKP)
has failed to be a significant component in the West German
political system, winning a slight 0.3 percent of the vote
17in the election of October 3, 1976.
Before discussing the conditions which have proven advan-
tageous to the growth and increased significance of the
Communist Parties in Italy, France and Spain, the twenty-
four countries having Communist Parties in Western Europe
are listed in Table 1.
The largest Communist Parties are found in Italy, France
and Spain. Various conditions within Italy favored the growth
of a large Communist Party. It was difficult for a postwar
Italian government to follow a forceful or uniform route to
social reform. Reasons included the shallow base of unity
in the country as well as the expansive economic abyss
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problems of a large and inefficient bureaucracy, the crip-
pling of the government due to a series of shifting coali-
tion cabinets, and the exemption of the wealthy from taxa-
tion, adding to the burden of the economic situation. The
Christian Democratic Party (DC) , the ruling political party
since the 1940 's, was unable to maintain its voter popularity
because of its reputation for corruption, its failure to con-
trol the economy, and its refusal to espouse social reforms.
The Communist Party capitalized on these deficiencies. The
result was a very strong showing for the PCI in the June
1976 parliamentary elections, where the Communist Party won
34.4 percent of the vote. Since that date, however, popu-
larity of the PCI has declined, with a drop in voter support
to 30.4 percent in the June 1979 elections.
In France, the national situation is different.. France
has a long tradition of revolutionary activity and the Com-
munist Party has benefitted greatly from it. There is a vast
gulf between the rich and the poor of France, more so than
is evident in Italy. The laboring class has gained smaller
proportions of economic prosperity compared to others of
Western Europe. Aiding the growth of Communism was the dis-
crediting of the Socialist Party, the main opponent of the
Communists, with the working class of France by supporting
colonial wars and by "playing the Fourth Republic parliamen-
19tary game." Finally, the French Communists were able to
assume the mantle of national heroes in the resistance move-
ment aimed against Hitler's domination of the country, which
22

enhanced their public image and national popularity.
Following World War II, the PCF participated in coalition
government until 1947. However, since 1958, the influence
of the Communists has been decreasing. Currently, the
Socialist Party is approximately twice as strong as the
Communist Party in electoral support and would have been
the obvious leader in any coalition between the two parties.
Most polls predicted the success of this coalition in the
March 1978 parliamentary elections, despite difficulties
encountered the previous September in renegotiating the
"common program". The result of the election was a surprising
defeat for the PCF, which received 20.55 percent of the vote,
the lowest percentage since 1945, with the exception of 1958.
While the long-term effect on the PCF is unclear, it appears
unlikely that the Communists will be able to rise to the high
level of popularity seen in the Spring of 1977.
Just as the French case differs from the Italian, so
does the Spanish differ from the others. Since its legaliza-
tion in April 1977, the PCE has been outspoken in urging
independence from the CPSU and emphasizing a strong national
road to socialism. The party operated illegally and in exile
from 1939 until 1977 and developed from a Stalinist, pro-
Moscow party into an independent "Eurcommunist" party, the
term used frequently by its leader, Santiago Carrillo. He
runs the party, maintaining strict control over its operations
In its first post-Franco test of electoral appeal, the PCE
did not do as well as expected, receiving 9.4 percent of the
23

vote. The 1979 election results also produced less than 10
percent. The PCE is the best organized force in post-
20Franco Spain, owing much of its effectiveness to Carrillo.
C. IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
In a discussion of the diversities that separate the
Communist Parties of Western Europe from the CPSU, it is
important to identify the ideological differences between
the two. Soviet Communism was founded on the teachings of
Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin and strengthened by the totali-
tarian principles of Joseph Stalin. The Marxist-Leninist
Model consists of the following basic tenets:
1. A deterministic and materialistic interpretation
of history
2. A revolutionary transformation of the old society
3. Rule by a dictatorship of the working class, through
the communist party
4. Egalitarianism in all areas of society
5. Anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism
6. Public ownership and state-governmental control
of the important economic functions of society
7. Building a progressive-humanitarian society which
promotes the welfare of all citizens in matters
of health, education, employment and culture. 21
The Eurocommunist parties do not adhere to these princi-
ples, but rather express views of democratic pluralism and
support parliamentary institutions. They disavow rule by
revolutionary tactics. The classic Soviet definition of a
communist revolutionary shows him, in the words of Joseph
Stalin, as one who "without evasions, unconditionally,
24

openly, and honestly makes the cause of world revolution
synonymous with the interests and, indeed, with the defense
22
of the USSR." Certainly, the liberal Western European
Communist Parties do not advocate such a view. Not only do
they believe that the peaceful road to socialism is the best
and safest one, but they also disagree with the required
support and defense of the Soviet Union.
Other ideological differences exist that are unaccep-
table to the Soviet leaders. The rejection of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat by the European Communist Parties
and the abandonment of class struggle are two significant
actions by the Eurocommunists . The party elite of the CPSU
viewed these moves as direct steps away from the Soviet model
It can be assumed that these independence-oriented gestures
caused serious difficulties to the Russian leaders. The
continued affirmation of national independence by the Western
European parties could affect seriously the hegemonial
23
control of the USSR over the Soviet Bloc nations
.
To the Russians, the "supreme form of democracy" is the
dictatorship of the proletariat. The PCI, the PCF and the
PCE have eliminated this concept. Similarly, proletarian
internationalism, referring to obedience to Moscow, is
strongly emphasized by the Soviet Union. However, the French
proclaim socialisme aux couleurs de la France, the Italians
stress "critical solidarity", and the Spanish announce that
the old-style internationalism is dead. The PCE believe




Two accomplishments by the Eurocommunists appear to
show a real distinction between these parties and other
Communist Parties in the world. The declarations separate
the Eurocommunists from the Soviets. First, in the area
of domestic policy goals, the Eurocommunists stated emphatically
that they will pursue these goals on the basis of national
needs, adapting Marxist theory to their cultural, political,
intellectual, national and economic conditions. Second, they
declared their freedom to determine issues of foreign policy
without reference to or consideration of Soviet foreign
policy demands, decisions or pronouncements. The latter
proclamation is of particular import in that some of the
West European Communist Parties are eager to become members
of the left-wing broad coalition governments and assert that
the foreign policy programs they pursue will be based on
25
national interests, not Soviet demands or interests.
These statements of independence show that there is a
strong surge for ideological freedom from the Soviet Union
developing in Western Europe. This divergence from the
ideological constraints of the USSR is another example of
the ability of the Eurocommunists to demonstrate their
autonomy. Many experts agree that the Eastern European
countries are bound to the USSR not by ideology but rather




D. INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW?
Just as there are critics who discount the existence
of Eurocommunism so, too, are there writers and scholars who
say that independence of this Communist group from Moscow
is a hoax, a complete myth. Many examples are cited as
instances when the Eurocommunists have shown loyalty rather
than hostility toward the Soviet Union. One of the chief
areas of controversy concerns Soviet foreign policy actions.
None of the three Eurocommunist Parties voiced criticism or
opposition to the transportation of Cuban troops in Russian
aircraft into Angola. In fact, Georges Marchais strongly
approved of the involvement of Cuban soldiers at the direction
of Moscow.
Of greater significance are the more recent pronounce-
ments of the French Communists regarding the Soviet Union's
invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979. The French Com-
munist Party supported the military intervention in Afghanis-
tan. In a statement issued by the party's Politburo on
January 5, 19 80, the PCF endorsed the right of all nations
to request assistance from allies to prevent foreign inter-
ference. In fact, shortly thereafter, Party leader Marchais
visited Moscow at the invitation of Leonid Brezhnev, thereby
reinforcing his support for the Soviet action and diminish-
ing, if not eliminiating his Communist party from those
known as Eurocommunist. On the issue of Afghanistan, the
French Communists stood alone. The PCI and the PCE condemned
27

the Soviet actions as a violation of the principles of
2 6independence and sovereignty.
Unlike Angola, on the other hand, the contretemps in
Zaire was viewed in a different light by the Eurocommunists
As a form of foreign aid being offered by the West, the
Zaire episode was considered an incident which, according
to the Eurocommunists, should have been resolved without
foreign interference. This is an example of the anti-
Western attitude of the Communist Parties of Western Europe
Other examples of congruence with Soviet policy include
the sudden shift of the three parties from staunch support
of Somalia to backing Ethiopia, and the condemnation of
Israeli liberation of Jewish hostages at Entebbe as "an
27intolerable violation of Ugandan national sovereignty."
In each of these cases, support for the Soviet Union was
strong and evident. According to Ledeen, no Eurocommunist
party has clashed with the Kremlin on foreign policy issues
He states that on matters involving the struggle between
democracy and totalitarianism, there is virtual identity of
foreign policies between the Western European Communists
2 8
and the Soviet Union. However, the recent events in
Afghanistan dispel this theory.
While such may be the case in most instances, there
is room for discussion and exception to the statement that
there exists complete concurrence on foreign policy matters
between the Soviet Union and the Eurocommunists. To cite
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examples, one need only look to Spain and its views on
certain major issues to see a contradiction to this theory.
The Communist Party of Spain has declared strong support
for the European Economic Community, has expressed toler-
ance of Spain's entry into the NATO Alliance and has shown
enthusiasm for the presence of US bases in Spain. These
actions demonstrate a clear position of independence from
Moscow as well as incongruence on issues of foreign policy,
as does the Spanish and Italian condemnation of the Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan.
Roy Macridis discusses three basic criteria which measure
the degree of independence of a communist party vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union. Macridis concludes that the longer a
country has conformed to Soviet policies, the surer will be
its subservience. Second, the policy "stakes" involved must
be taken into account. Each action of a communist party is
weighed by the Kremlin and, when the stakes are too high, the
Soviet Union will step in and take control. Third, concerns
the manner in which the national communist party responds to
Soviet cues. The greater the response to a Soviet policy
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stand, the greater the subservience.
With the Eurocommunist parties, there is a "grey area"
of behavior between independence and subordination. Two
basic models, highlighted by Macridis, can be used to evalu-
ate the actions of the Western European Communist Parties.
The "international" model assumes that close ties exist among
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all communist parties of the world and that the CPSU furnishes
the leadership and, thereby, maintains and exercises control
over them. The second model, the "national" model, under
the label of Eurocommunism, espouses the independence of
the national communist parties to follow goals for the good
of national interests and needs, regardless of Soviet impera-
30tives.
The "national" model was clearly emphasized by Jean
Kanapa, head of the Foreign Affairs section of the Polit-
bureau of the PCF, when he declared that the French have a
strong desire to mold their own path to socialism. Kanapa
wrote that the PCF defines its own policy objectives inde-
31pendently and tolerates no foreign interference. While
this may have been true at one time, Marchais ' post-Afghanis-
tan visit to Moscow raises doubt about this policy.
Jacques Chirac, President of the Gaullist Party, is very
critical of the PCF and its proclamations. Chirac notes that
the PCF supported Soviet aggression in Africa and he claims
that neither the PCI nor the PCE are independent of the Krem-
lin. As documentation, he quotes Berlinguer's statement
that "the Soviet Union's policy of peace is pursued in the
general interest of humanity", and Chirac notes that Carrillo
insists on the "resolutely defensive character of the Warsaw
32
Pact." *
An even stronger testimony of the loyalty of the PCI
is presented by Ledeen when he quotes the famous statement
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of Berlinguer to the London Times in February 1976:
We support the fundamental philosophy behind
the policy of peaceful coexistence and detente
that is being practiced by the Soviet Union... the
Soviet Union's peace policy is in the general
interest of mankind. 33
Ledeen also notes that the fidelity to Moscow trans-
cends the foreign policy issues to include financial depen-
dence. At the end of World War II, the PCI was totally
dependent on Soviet aid for survival. The party leader,
Palmiro Togliatti, attempted to reduce this reliance on
Russian support and developed a successful import-export
operation with the PCI as the "middleman" for Italian busi-
nesses trading behind the Iron Curtain. While this action
did benefit the party and lessened dependence on direct
Soviet aid, the PCI still relies on Russian transactions for
34income.
While the Eurocommunists profess independence and self-
reliance, there is a real question as to the validity of
this claim. There is more freedom of speech and action in
Western Europe than in countries of the Soviet Bloc. How-
ever, the belief that Eurocommunist parties are independent
is still open to debate. As Hassner stated, the Eurocommunists
"remain Communist Parties retaining centralized organization
and a measure of loyalty to the Soviet Union."
An area of general agreement among writers on Euro-
communism is that there is no consensus on either the exis-
tence of the trend or the meaning of the term. However, the
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subject is an important one in that the possibility of the
phenomenon becoming a viable element of Western European
government cannot be ruled out. Whether "Eurocommunism" or
"Western European Communist Parties", however this group
of moderate Communists is labeled, one should be ready to
understand and cope with this brand of Communism. A dis-
cussion of the development of the Eurocommunist trend will
aid in this understanding. By being aware of the origins
of the parties and the influences which played a significant
role in the formation of the doctrines and principles of
the parties, it is easier to comprehend the proclamations
of the French, Italian and Spanish Communist Parties.
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III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EUROCOMMUNISM AND THE PCI
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROCOMMUNISM
When considering the origins of Eurocommunism and its
evolution, the question arises as to the "newness" of this
trend. Statements espousing "national roads to socialism"
and "devotion to democratic principles" were witnessed
shortly after World War II by the leaders of the various
European Communist Parties.
In (our country) there is a division of func-
tions, and State power is based on parliamentary
democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat
or of a single party is not essential. (Our coun-
try) can proceed and is proceeding along her own
road.
-Speech by Wladyslaw Gomulka
Polish Communist Party Leader
(January, 1946)
The crux of the matter, and we Marxists should
know this well, is this: every nation will effect
its transition to Socialism not by a mapped-out
route, not exactly as in the Soviet Union, but by
its own road, dependent on its historical, national,
social and cultural circumstances.
-Speech by Georgi Dimitrov
Leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party
(February, 1946)
The Communist Party seeks to attain Socialism,
but we are of the opinion that the Soviet system
is not the only road to Socialism. . .The coalition
of the Communists with other parties is not oppor-
tunistic, a temporarily limited coalition, but the
expression. . .of all strata of the working people...
We seek at present to make certain that our new
democratic parliamentary methods... be expressed in
constitutional law.
-Statement by Klement Gottwald




The views expressed by these leaders of Eastern European
countries in the 1940 's parallel those of the current
spokesmen of the Western Communist parties.
Major post-war events contributed to the rise of Euro-
communism. The departure of Yugoslavia's Tito from the
Communist camp in 1948, the uprisings in Poland and Hungary
during the mid-1950' s and, most notably, the split of the
Chinese Communist Party from the Soviet Union in 1960-61,
aided the development of more democratic government by the
Western Communists. The Prague Spring of 19 68, the attempt
of Czechoslovak reformers to create a model of socialism
unlike that of the Soviets and based on Western tradition,
is considered by one leading expert on the Soviet Union to
2be "the forerunner of Eurocommunism. " The support offered
by the PCI, PCF and PCE for Dubcek and his policy of "socialism
with a human face" was the first joint action by these three
groups of Eurocommunists
.
These events and other minor demonstrations against the
authority of the Soviet Union have eroded the monolithic
feature of Russian Communism, established by Lenin and
strengthened by Stalin. The inability of Moscow to organize
a recent world-wide Communist and Workers' Parties meeting
contributed to the deterioration of the Soviet hold on Com-
munist Parties around the globe. The last such gathering,
the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties,
held in East Berlin in June, 1976 was to address the "struggle
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for peace, security, cooperation, and social progress in
-3
Europe" and was to be held "no later than mid-1975."
From the initial requests for the meeting in November
1973 until its convening, over two and one-half years of
laborious preparation had elapsed. There was great diffi-
culty in achieving agreement on a document acceptable to all
participants. While the Soviets and their "loyalist"
supporters desired a reconfirmation of the principles of
democratic centralism, dictatorship of the proletariat and
the undisputed position of the CPSU leadership over world
communism, the Eurocommunists
,
joined by the Romanians and
the Yugoslavs, strongly opposed these concepts. The final
document was a major defeat for Moscow, with the CPSU con-
ceding the very issues the Eurocommunists were demanding so
vehemently ( i.e. , abandonment of the principle of "prole-
tarian internationalism," formal recognition of the equality
and autonomy of every Communist Party, and so forth)
.
The unquestioned victory of the West European Communists
at the East Berlin conference added momentum to their drive
for independence from the Soviets. It was clear following
this pan-European conference that the differences between
the two Communists groups were major in scope and depth and
were most likely irreconciliable. It was highly unlikely
that another such meeting would be held any time in the near
future, owing to the deep schism and open disagreement wit-
nessed in East Berlin.
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In March, 1977 the three Eurocommunist parties showed
their strongest determination to express their independence
and unity while resisting Soviet pressures, which had emerged
after Berlin. At a summit meeting in Madrid to signify
support for the soon-to-be legalized Spanish Communist Party,
Berlinguer and Marchais joined Carrillo in an unprecedented
move. Against the authority of the Soviet Union and in
direct violation of an earlier warning from the Russians in
1974 that no regional meetings of Communists were to be held
nor was any Communist Party to organize a Congress without
4Soviet representation, the three Communist leaders met openly
and discussed topics of national as well as regional con-
cern. It was following this meeting that, according to




As previously noted, the French, Spanish and Italian
Communist Parties are considered to be Eurocommunists . It
is the PCI that is the most significant of the three for
various reasons. The PCF suffered a decisive setback in
the March 1978 national elections. The Communists polled
only 19 percent of the vote, one of the lowest percentages
since World War II, thus placing the PCF on the political
sidelines for the time being. Additionally, France has not
participated in the integrated military organization of the
NATO Alliance since its dramatic withdrawal in 1966. The
Spanish party is still relatively small in membership,
attracting a slight nine percent of the vote in the June 1977
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and 1979 elections. While Spain does maintain bi-lateral
agreements with the United States, authorizing the use of
its territory for military bases, Spain is not a member of
NATO.
The PCI is the second largest political party in Italy
and, notwithstanding a recent decline in voter popularity,
evidenced by a four percent loss of voter support in the
June 1979 national election, the Communists could stage a
significant resurgence at this precarious period in the
country's history. Furthermore, Italy is an active member
in the NATO Alliance, participating in such committees as
the Nuclear Planning Group, and providing armed forces and
bases in support of allied defense. Because of this direct
participation in NATO and the possibility of a government
including the Communist Party, two factors not evident in
France and Spain, this study now concentrates attention on
Italy and its unique circumstances pertaining to the PCI.
To understand more fully the policies and positions of
the Italian Communist Party regarding domestic and inter-
national affairs, it is useful to have a knowledge of the
origins of this significant political party. An historical
discussion provides a valuable tool in analyzing the present
day principles of the PCI and understanding the basis for
the current doctrines of the party.
B. THE EARLY YEARS OF THE PCI
The origins of the Italian Communist Party can be traced
to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
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PCI was an outgrowth of a Marxist tradition created by the
Italian Socialist Party (PSI) , the political force that
had represented the poor, the laborers and the underprivi-
leged element of Italy's population. Throughout the pre-
World War I years, a tension had been rising between factions
within the PSI. On the one side were those supporting a
humanistic Marxist approach while on the other were party
members following an intellectual, doctrinal Marxism.
The PCI was established in January, 1921 at the Seven-
teenth Party Congress of the PSI, held in Livorno. A group
of radical Socialists, in response to Lenin's 21 Conditions
and the establishment of the Comintern, declaring that the
party was not revolutionary enough, and, therefore not repre-
senting its views, severed relations with the PSI, thus
forming the PCI. The following year saw the rise to power
of the Fascist leader Benito Mussolini, the new Prime Minister
of Italy. Having achieved a 65 percent majority in the elec-
tions of April 1924, the Fascists stepped up action against
the Communists with Mussolini launching a major attack against
his internal enemy.
Under the strong leadership of Antonio Gramsci, "the
7patron saint of the Italian Communist Party," the PCI by
1923 began to develop a highly effective and well-disciplined
structure whose goal was the formation of a communist state.
The commitment and loyalty to the Soviet Union was unques-
tioned. The PCI was forced underground in 1926 following
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the arrest and imprisonment of Gramsci by Mussolini. The
leadership of the party was passed by the Comintern to
Palmiro Togliatti, another intellectual figure within the
PCI. A close friend of Gramsci, Togliatti was in Moscow at
the time of the arrest, representing the PCI at Comintern
Headquarters. He would lead the party for the next thirty-
eight years, proving to be highly instrumental in molding
its present day positions. Until his death in 1964, Togliatti
remained the party's chief, in the beginning as a little-
known exile and by 1944, as one of the country's most respected
g
and feared public figures.
From 1928 until 1934, the Italian Communists remained
in exile and isolated from other opposition groups. How-
ever, a dramatic change in party position occurred in 19 34
when the PCI joined the Socialist Party, led by Pietro Nenni
and Giuseppe Saragat, to fight against Fascism. It is signi-
ficant to note that this action, sanctioned by the Comintern
at its Seventh Congress in 1935, was the beginning of a
9
series of "unity of action" pacts formed by these parties.
This period of the Popular Front (1934-1939) saw most action
taking place in Spain during its Civil War with the Communists
fighting to aid the Republicans and Mussolini providing sup-
port to Franco's regime.
The Spanish Civil War and the "Armed Resistance" move-
ment in Northern Italy contributed toward the PCI's entrance
into the heroic phase of its history. With all its strength
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directed toward fighting the Fascist enemy, the PCI was able
to acquire the moral and political distinction that trans-
formed it from an insignificant exile organization into a
powerful political party of the masses.
C. THE POST-WAR YEARS
The end of World War II witnessed the emergence of a
powerful Communist Party in Italy. Factors contributing
to this position of strength included an ever-increasing
party membership, unified in structure and inspired by the
prison writings of Antonio Gramsci, a formidable performance
during the Resistance movement and an organizational base
throughout the country and in the labor unions.
Between 1943 and 1947 the party membership grew dramati-
cally. Table 2 illustrates the magnitude of this growth.
TABLE 2







SOURCE: Donald L.M. Blackmer, "Postwar Italian Commu-
nism," Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds
.
Communism in Italy and France (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975), p. 35.
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The incredibly rapid growth of the PCI aided it in
realizing Palmiro Togliatti's model of the partito nuovo
,
a model whose purpose was to combine the virtues of a cadre
party and a mass party. With difficulty, Togliatti con-
vinced many of the PCI organizers that the strategy of
national unity declared in 1944 had its organizational
counterpart in the partito nuovo:
. . .our party must today become a great mass party;
and this is why we say to the old comrades, who
might have a tendency to remain a small group, the
group of those who have remained pure, faithful to
the ideals and to the thought, we say to them: "You
are wrong, you will be a leading group to the degree
that you will be able to make of our party a great
mass party, a great organizer which has in its own
ranks all the elements necessary to establish con-
tacts with all categories of the Italian people
and to direct them all toward the goals that we
are proposing to achieve. "*-*
Togliatti proposed a set of policy guidelines to be
followed by the PCI in carrying out its strategy of attain-
ing power. These imperatives provided the basis for a great
deal of the PCI's behavior during Togliatti's lifetime and
on through the 19 70 's. While this party behavior may have
been inconsistent at times due to changes in the international
climate ( i.e. , the Cold War) , it tends to have its foundation
in these imperatives of Togliatti:
(.1) Renounce violent seizure as the means to obtain
power in Italy.
(2) Avoid at all costs a direct confrontation with
the Catholic Church. Eschew anticlericalism; seek
an accommodation with the Catholic hierarchy.
(3) Avoid sectarianism and isolation in politics
and society. Seek points of communication, accommo-
dation, and common action with other groups, including
segments of the middle class.
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(4) Play a major role in shaping the institutions
of the democratic republic. Be prepared to accept
these institutions, to operate within them, and to
defend them against attack and erosion.
(5) Avoidd contributing to the reemergence or growth
of a strong right-wing political movement.
(6) Press for fundamental social and economic trans-
formations and bring the pressure of public opinion
and popular organizations to bear in favor of them.
Do not be too specific, however, about the content
of these reforms before the party comes to power. ^
The Italian Communist Party actively participated in
the parliamentary government during the immediate post-war
years. The Minister of Justice until 1947 was the party
leader, Togliatti, With internal politics at work, however,
a shift of authority took place in the election year of
1948. The Communists suffered a severe loss to the newly
formed coalition of Christian Democrats (DC) , Social Demo-
crats (PSDI) and Liberals (PLI) . The election results of
April, 1948 showed the DC with a clear majority of 307 seats
in the Chamber of Deputies while the Communist-Socialist
front elected only 182 deputies. The failure of the policy
of constructive cooperation with other parties and the
Church, adopted by the Communists, produced a serious set-
14back to the party.
An extended "period of confrontation" (1948-1953)
followed this major defeat of the PCI. As a result of its
policy of collaboration, the Italian Communists were severely
criticized by Moscow which scorned the party for thinking
that such participation with bourgeoise governments could be
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conceivable. The FCI reverted to a policy more clasically
Communist in nature. The Communists acted in a basically
constructive manner within parliament. However, on both the
domestic and international levels, the party voiced opposi-
tion to the policies being enacted by the Italian leadership
( i.e. , membership in the NATO Alliance, participation in the
Marshall Plan) . Such objections were made in the context
of its minority position and the PCI accepted its limited
1
6
role at the time. The party concentrated its efforts on
strengthening its "presence" in all realms of Italian society,
the arts, the sciences, mass media and so forth.
During the 1950 's, the PCI gained a slight degree of
political maneuverability. Furthermore, the party was aided
in its resumption of a strategy of alliances by the Soviet
shift to "peaceful co-existence" as well as the de-Staliniza-
tion of the CPSU and the developing Sino-Soviet split.
In 1956, Secretary General Togliatti publicly announced
the party's domestic strategy of the "Italian road to social-
ism, " and the doctrine of "polycentrism. " This proclamation
signalled no new or drastic shift in party policy. However,
as expressed by Norman Kogan, "the doctrine threatened the
organizational essence of the international Communist move-
ment, for it rejected the role of the Soviet Union as the
leading state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
17(CPSU) as the guiding party of that movement." It was a
philosophy such as this that carried over into present day
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trends and formed a basis for the Western European Communist
Parties' independence of the CPSU, hence Eurocommunism.
Despite a leftward swing of the political spectrum in
the late 1950' s, the PCI was unable to reap any immediate
benefits. A major political development occurred in 1963
with the formation of a center-left coalition government,
frequently referred to as "the opening to the left." This
coalition, including the DC, the Socialists, along with the
Social Democrats and the Republicans, governed Italy for
almost fifteen years. During this time, the PCI was encoun-
tering internal organizational splits. With the death of
Togliatti in 1964, his strong-armed, authoritarian style of
rule could not be passed on to his successor, Luigi Longo
.
Differences within the leadership were accentuated by the
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Serious questions arose:
How closely should the PCI collaborate with non-Communist




Notwithstanding these factional difficulties, the PCI
continued to gain strength in the electoral process, espe-
cially with the new center-left government proving to lack
the strength necessary to counter the country's economic and
social weaknesses. Table 3 provides a clear picture of the
electoral history of the three largest parties in Italy.
Not only at the national level, but also at the local
level, the Communists were making great advances in popularity,




PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE FOR THE THREE
MAJOR ITALIAN PARTIES, 1946-1976
Communist Socialist Christian
Year Party Party Democrats
1946 18.9 ~ 20.7 35.2




1958 22.7 14.3 42.4
1963 25.3 13.9 38.3
1968 27.0 14. 5b 39.1
1972 27.2 9.6 38.7
1976 34.4 9.6 38.7
1979° 30.4 9.8 38.3
SOURCE: Giacomo Sani, "Mass Support for Italian
Communism," Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartor i, eds
.
, Euro-
communism: The Italian Case (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978)
,
p. 69.
Communists and Socialists contested the election of
1948 together.
The Socialists ran with the Social Democrats in 1968.
cUpdated results included by author ( Los Angeles Times ,
December 25, 19 79)
.
With the socioeconomic condition of the country deteriorating
to crisis proportions, it was becoming more evident every





The beginning of a new decade saw the change in party
leadership of the PCI shift once again from Luigi Longo to
Enrico Berlinguer in 1972. Shortly thereafter, in the fall
of 1973, Berlinguer surprised the world as well as his fellow
party members by announcing that the PCI would accept and
support a compromesso storico. The significance of such a
move and the meaning of the phrase itself warrant explanation
and elaboration. Berlinguer realized that a 51 percent
majority would be insufficient to govern the country and
draw it out of its economic and social malaise. The experi-
ence of Allende in Chile was another factor which greatly
contributed to Berlinguer' s proposal of a broad coalition of
democratic parties to govern Italy. It was evident that
too narrow a front policy would polarize the society and
would incite a reactionary counter-attack.
Roy Godson and Stephen Haseler in their book 'Euro -




analysis of the strategy of the historic compromise. The
compromesso storico exists on two levels. First, in social
terms, it is "an attempted unification of a broad range of
diverse social groups, including both the proletariat and...
20
'the Catholic masses.'" Secondly, it is political: the
securing of a party alliance between the PCI and the DC.
The social content is an appealing and seductive propaganda
point with the bourgeois politicians. With an aim toward
uniting potentially antagonistic groups in order to stabilize
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the system, the historic compromise is an appeal for order,
authority and unity, a national longing in an unsettled
country. Such an aim is an obvious vote winner. While the
PCI has increased its showing in national elections since
1946 (excluding 1979) , it has only surpassed the 30 percent
barrier since its historic compromise matured into PCI policy
It remains the most ambitious, daring strategy for power of
21
any Western European Communist Party.
Under the leadership of Berlinguer, the PCI has made
dramatic gains in electoral support. Notwithstanding a
recent decline, the party had surpassed previous obstacles of
society, religion and politics to become a major influence
in the country. In 19 74, the PCI succeeded in winning a
national referendum for the reform of Italy's divorce law.
The following year saw increased electoral strength in
regional elections, with the PCI playing a major role in
every principal Italian city and controlling the administra-
tions of 25 percent of the country's regions. The highest
success of all came in the 1976 parliamentary elections when
the PCI amassed a stunning 34.4 percent of the vote, a spec-
tacular showing for the party. With this victory came the
presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and four committee
chairmanships in the Chamber and three in the Senate. While
the PCI did not gain a formal role in the government, the




Since the 1976 elections, the Italian Communist Party
has encountered a number of serious difficulties. In 1977
the party lost much of its influence among the student popu-
lation. Luciano Lama, the Communist head of the General
Confederation of Italian Laborers, was driven off the campus
at Rome University in February when trying to play the role
23
of the peacemaker in student disputes.
The governmental crisis of January-March 1978 was resolved
in a manner which humiliated and injured the PCI and its
image. It was begun reluctantly by the Communists shortly
after an enormous strike and demonstration in Rome organized
by the militant Metalworkers' Union in December. While the
Communists could not ignore the success of the uprising, they
realized the political repercussions of drawing this situa-
tion to a head. The party responded to calls for decisive
governmental action against the current economic chaos by
demanding full participation in the government. The Chris-
tian Democrats were determined not to relent under such de-
mands. This caused the PCI to back down to a more flexible
position as it did not want to force new elections. History
has shown that the political party that precipitates an
election does not fare well in the polls.
The PCI agreed to support a cabinet of highly qualified
independent or technical ministers. While Prime Minister
Andreotti initially agreed to these Communist wishes, he
did not uphold his promise, but rather appointed an all-




extreme embarrassment to the PCI. The Communists were
allowed to vote for the government in the parliamentary
25
vote of confidence, not just abstain from voting against it.
Compounding this situation was the sensational kidnapping
and brutal murder of Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro,
the father of rapprochement between the DC and the PCI
.
Terrorism escalated throughout the country, causing concern
among all factions of Italy. The Communists could not avoid
criticism accusing them of involvement in the shocking Moro
event. Condemnation was followed by loss of support in the
local elections of May, just one week after Moro ' s body was
found near PCI headquarters in Rome. While the PCI antici-
pated a minor setback, the magnitude of their losses, an
eight percent decline in votes, came as a devastating shock
2 6
which demoralized the party.
In January 19 79, the government fell once again when
Berlinguer announced that the PCI would not support the
government. The Andreotti government fell after an eleven-
month alliance with the Italian Communists, the thirty-sixth
in the past thirty-four years. The Communists insisted upon
seats in the new government, and when refused, Berlinguer
proclaimed that he will take his party into the opposition
for the first time since 1976.
The PCI held its Fifteenth National Congress in Rome
from March 30th to April 3rd, 1979. Much had changed since
the previous Congress in 19 75, held on the eve of the local
election when the PCI nearly surpassed the DC in voter support
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The central message delivered by the "doleful-looking"
secretary Berlinguer at the recent Congress was that the
party's strategy of 1973 of forming an "historic compromise"
27had "evaporated." Enthusiasm within the party had waned
as it faced the prospect of losing a fair number of votes
in the upcoming June election. Furthermore, party membership,
at approximately 1,790,000 was down 24,000 from the previous
year. New recruitment to the PCI in 1978 was 41 percent
2 8lower than in 1976.
Pessimism proved well-founded as the PCI emerged from
the June 3-4, 1979 national elections with 30.4 percent of
the vote, a major decline of four percent from the 1976 re-
turns . This was the first decline in party support in more
than twenty years. While the victory of 1976 was not re-
peated in 1979, the PCI is strong and a force to reckon with.
In the words of Enrico Berlinguer on the night of the defeat,
"There will still be the Communist question to resolve; they
29
will still have to come to terms with our party."
The power and force behind this statement of Berlinguer'
s
reinforces the need to be ever-aware of the Communist Party
of Italy. This discussion of the development and current
status of the Italian Communist Party aids in understanding
the present position of Italy within the NATO Alliance. By
realizing the potential strength and capabilities of the
PCI and the significant role the Communists could play in
future governments, it is now logical to focus attention
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upon the NATO Alliance. How credible a deterrent is the
Alliance? What are the attitudes of its members to its
ability to combat enemy aggression? Can NATO be depended
upon in time of crisis and how will the integral components




IV. THE NATO ALLIANCE; THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY
A. THE NATO ALLIANCE
From its establishment in April, 1949, NATO has main-
tained as its primary objective the deterrence of Soviet
aggression in Western Europe. For the past thirty years,
the Alliance has enhanced the cohesion of Western Europe,
providing the needed stability and confidence for the pursuit
of detente and realistic arms control. The magnitude of
the NATO Alliance is evident in the fact that the treaty
area encompasses over 8.5 million square miles and includes
a population in excess of 560 million. The combined military
manpower of the Alliance consists of 4.3 million members in
the regular armed forces and 5.1 million in the reserves.
While the goal of deterrence of aggression has been con-
stant, there has arisen a serious doubt as to the recent
capability of the Alliance to defend itself from its main
enemy, the Soviet Union. Studies have been conducted by the
Congress as well as the Department of Defense to ascertain
the warfighting capability of the NATO Alliance vis-a-vis
the Warsaw Pact nations. One such report was issued by the
subcommittee on the Atlantic Alliance of the House Armed
Services Committee in February, 1979. The panel asserted
that the Alliance lacked the means to defend Europe and called
NATO's potential to fight a protracted war "almost non-
2
existent." The report further stated
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The major readiness deficiency of the NATO Al-
liance is that it does not have enough resources
to provide a credible defense. . .Evidence avail-
able. .. suggests that European forces will begin
to run out of equipment and ammunition in a matter
of days rather than weeks and months... 3
Two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey Bartlett, presented an enlight-
ening and informative report in January, 1977. It addressed
various aspects of NATO in relation to the "new Soviet
threat." Specifically, in discussing the state of Alliance
defenses today, the co-authors stated that NATO defenses are
not what they should be. Six major problem areas were iden-
tified as possible causes of the deteriorated condition.
These included: (1) declining real defense expenditures,
expecially in the crucial Central Region, (2) shrinking
active force levels, (3) the refusal of France to partici-
pate in NATO's integrated military commands, (4) pulling
back of key formations to the Low Countries, (.5) continued
dissipation of NATO combat power through reliance on many
different weapons, tactics,, procedures and supplies, and,
finally, (6) the inability of NATO's conventional forces to
4
counter increased Warsaw Pact defense build-up.
An assessment of the effects of Eurocommunism on the NATO
Alliance is dependent upon the strength of the organization
as well as the power structure of NATO. The cohesion of the
Alliance is of primary importance. NATO has frequently been
5described as being in "a state of shocking disarray." But
Robert Osgood point outs, it's no wonder that such is the
53

description, considering that NATO is a peacetime alliance
among many democratic countries with divergent as well as
convergent interests. In addition, the Alliance requires
continual budgetary sacrifices and inter-allied accommoda-
tions to preserve military security when the prospect of




Despite all this, the NATO Alliance has managed to main-
tain its strength and relative stability through great changes
in East-West relations, inter-allied associations and politi-
cal and economic situations. It serves the military and
political purposes for which it was established. According
to Osgood, "NATO could not have done so if it were not regarded
by its member governments and their constituents as vital
to their national security and to cooperative and orderly
7
relations with each other."
With the highlighting of these observations, what can
be said about the current threat to NATO? Unlike past threats,
which included the prospect of active Soviet aggression,
the control of nuclear weapons, the doubts about the con-
tinued maintenance of U.S. troops in Europe, to name a few,
today's threats involve the steady growth in military capa-
bility of the Warsaw Pact vis-a-vis NATO, the reduced and
uncertain ties of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the danger of
Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era, and
the prospect of Communists obtaining positions of power and
dominance in Italy. The Eurocommunists pose a challenge to
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NATO as well. Within the context of the NATO/Warsaw Pact
military strength debate, Senators Nunn and Bartlett have
delineated further the actual threatening areas as ground
force expansion, ground force modernization, the transforma-
tion of Soviet tactical airpower and the decreased warning
9time advantage held by the Soviets.
While the problems facing NATO are serious ones and the
threat from the Russians ever present, NATO continues to be
the key to the defense of Western Europe. Notwithstanding
the internal problems of the organization and the question of
the credibility of NATO, the Alliance is basically sound and
will continue to pursue its goal of countering the USSR and
thereby securing peace in Western Europe.
B. RECENT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
Within the past three years, major developments have
occurred relative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
At the May 1977 NATO Summit held in London, President Jimmy
Carter startled the treaty members with the request for a
commitment to a 3 percent annual increase in defense spending
as a means to remedy substantial deficiencies within the
organization. Such a program was scheduled to begin in 1979
and last for five years. Several nations were unable to meet
this goal while some governments refused to allocate the
designated amount for defense expenditures. But, the Alliance
as a whole has managed to commit approximately 2.9 percent
in the first year, bolstered greatly by France, Germany and
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the United Kingdom, where defense spending escalated by 5
percent in 1979.
A second significant program was proposed by the U.S.
at the London conference. President Carter initiated a
recommendation calling for NATO to increase its combat readi-
ness and to maintain the credibility of its strategy for the
next fifteen years. The program, known as the Long-Term
Defense Program (LTDP) , represents an unprecedented attempt
by the Alliance in these areas and covers ten categories
where major improvements are needed:
(1) combat readiness, to deal with the threat of
surprise attack;
(2) reinforcement, to speed the movement of troops
to Europe and forward areas in time of crisis;
(3) reserve mobilization, to use existing manpower
more effectively;
(4) maritime posture, to counter the growing Soviet
naval capability;
(5) air defense, to counter more sophisticated Soviet
air forces;
(6) command, control and communications, to provide
secure and reliable communications between dispersed
headquarters and to enhance the survivability of command
centers;
(7) electronic warfare, to counter Warsaw Pact capa-
bilities;
(8) rationalization of arms development and produc-
tion, to improve cost effectiveness through weapons
standardization and enhanced interoperability;
(9) logistics procedures and organization; and
(10) theater nuclear force modernization.
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The implementation of the program was endorsed at the
May 1978 summit held in Washington, D.C., where the plan
was reviewed in detail. By extending over a fifteen year
period, the program permits the utilization of orderly,
efficient weapons and equipment design and production, rather
than the present "every-country-for-itself " system. One
additional "plus" to the program came at the 1978 summit
when the armaments directors of France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and the United States agreed upon acceleration of
arms cooperation between Europe and the United States, a
. . 12bold experiment and a very promising effort.
Tracing the recent NATO conferences one step further,
the May 19 79 summit produced major contributions toward
improvement of the Alliance. The defense ministers agreed
upon a two-year extension - to 1986 - of the plan to increase
the annual defense spending figure by 3 percent. While no
more binding than the original agreement, it is a strong
restatement of NATO's conviction that this is the lowest
level of increase which will keep the member countries from
being outclassed by all the different types of new equipment
13being brought into the Warsaw Pact nations. The ministers
also approved the largest budget for infrastructure spending
in the history of NATO, approximately $4.5 billion over the
next five years, to be spent on roads, barracks, pipelines,
14
communications links and so forth.
The most consequential event to occur recently was the
decision by the NATO Alliance to modernize its Western
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Europe nuclear strike force with a new generation of medium-
range missiles capable of striking deep into the Soviet
Union. The plan calls for the deployment of 572 American-
manufactured Pershing II and cruise missiles in three and
perhaps five NATO nations. At the annual ministerial meeting
in Brussels December 12-14, 1979, the program won the approval
of the members, constituting the most crucial decision in
the thirty-one year history of the organization.
Specifically, the scheme involves the basing of 108
Pershing II missiles in West Germany and as many as 464
ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) would be located in
Britain, Italy and Belgium, with the possibility of deploy-
ment in the Netherlands at a later date. Figure 1 shows the
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The new missile systems would supplement NATO's current
long-range theater nuclear force which consists of British
Vulcan bombers, soon to be phased out of the arsenal, and
U.S. F-llls. In the event of a crisis, United Kingdom Polaris
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and some United
States Poseidon SLBMs would be committed to NATO. While
these sea-based systems are much less vulnerable, they are
not as accurate as land-based missiles, nor as able to per-
15form selective strikes.
The Pershing II and the cruise missiles are designed to
counter the fifty Soviet Backfire Bombers and as many as
150 intermediate-range SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe.
As the sponsor of the program, the U.S. insisted that the
modernization was necessary to meet this mounting Soviet threat.
If present trends were to continue, NATO strategists predict
that the Soviet Union's nuclear and conventional advantage
could tempt the Russians to risk war in Europe or attempt a
17form of blackmail of the European allies.
With this understanding of the current status of the
NATO Alliance and the significant developments which have
affected the organization, it is appropriate now to examine
the member country under study and to analyze the contribu-
tion made by Italy, a nation where the influence of the Com-
munist Party is momentous.
C. THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO NATO
Italy is the fourth largest European NATO country in
1
8
area, following Turkey, France and Norway, the second
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largest in total population after the Federal Republic of
Germany, and the fourth largest in total armed forces, after
19
France, West Germany and Turkey. Of the 365,000 military
personnel on active duty in Italy, the Army totals 254,000,
20
with the Air Force having 69,000 and the Navy, 42,000.
While these figures appear small in comparison to those of
the United States and West Germany, the Italian contribution
is equivalent to that of the Dutch, the Belgians and the
other minor allied nations. (See Appendix A for details.)
While Italy's defense structure is designed primarily
to protect the homeland, especially the critical northeastern
region, the country provides an important strategic geo-
graphical position for the NATO Alliance in the Mediterranean.
(See map at Appendix B.) Italy guards the choke point between
itself and Tunisia. By so doing, it is able to monitor
Soviet naval activity and other military* and civilian mari-
time movement in both basins of the sea. The country's
unique location also provides for quick movement of naval
units to either basin for patrols or training exercises.
This geographic significance was one of the primary factors
involved in the United States' move to maintain a large
defense contingent in Italy. A related issue was the French
withdrawal in 1966, when it became necessary to provide
21
alternate locations for various NATO facilities.
On the Italian mainland, Sicily and Sardinia, there are
approximately 11,000 U.S. military personnel and 18,000
22
civilians, including 16,000 dependents. (See Appendices
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C and D for a listing and location of military installations.)
The focus of activity is Naples. Allied Forces Southern
Europe (AFSOUTH) is headquartered in Naples, along with
various other subordinate commands: Allied Air Forces South-
ern Europe, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, Naval Strik-
ing and Support Forces. (The headquarters for the Allied
Land Forces Southern Europe is located in Verona.) While
not, as commonly believed the home port of the U.S. Navy's
Sixth Fleet, which is in Norfolk, Virginia, Naples does pro-
vide extensive maintenance, repair and logistic support to
American naval vessels. The Sixth Fleet flagship, tradi-
tionally a guided missile cruiser carrying sophisticated
communications equipment, is homeported in Gaeta, north of
Naples. Naples is also the operating base for Commander,
Task Force 67 (TF-67) , responsible for monitoring all ship-
ping in the Mediterranean of interest to the U.S., and Com-
mander, Task Force 6 9 (TF-69) , in charge of the nuclear-
powered hunter-killer submarines (SSN) patrolling the waters
23
of the Mediterranean.
Maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
aircraft operate from the naval air station in Sigonella,
Sicily, observing Soviet naval movements throughout the Medi-
terranean. A submarine tender for the SSNs is anchored off
La Maddalena in Sardinia and there are storage and other
24facilities on the island of San Stefano.
Two U.S. Army bases are located in Italy. Camp Ederle
at Vincenza is the home of two highly mobile fighting units
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prepared to deploy to any location in the Mediterranean Sea
or in Central Europe. Camp Darby, at Livorno (Leghorn),
provides logistic storage and is a command headquarters with
hospital and communications facilities. The U.S. Air Force
maintains two bases in Italy used as advanced bases for units
25
of the 16th Air Force. These are Aviano and Udine.
The detail provided on the NATO and U.S. military pre-
sence in Italy is of great importance since it should be
obvious that the loss of basing rights and facilities in
this NATO country, due to a coalition government with Com-
munist participation would strike a serious blow to the NATO
Alliance and to U.S. activity in the area. With the pre-
carious situation that exists in Turkey and Greece, a change
in the status quo vis-a-vis Italy would cause grave damage
to the stability and security of the southern flank. The
eastern Mediterranean has witnessed an erosion of its
political-military posture. U.S. operations were suspended
in Turkey, and Greece withdrew from NATO's integrated com-
mand structure. The pro-Western attitudes in this critical
2 fi
region have now dissipated. Neither the NATO Alliance nor
the United States can afford to have one of its closest
members upset the fragile balance any further. Such action
would be an open invitation to further unrest and disorder.
D. U.S. INTERESTS IN NATO AND ITALY
Robert Osgood, author of numerous works on NATO, iden-




a more recent writing, Osgood lists three interests of
primary importance:
(1) The maintenance of an organized allied mili-
tary force that will deter Soviet aggression
against Western Europe, provide our European allies
with a confident sense of security, and success-
fully cope with a military encounter if
deterrence should fail.
(2) The maintenance of a harmonious international
order among the allies, based on a mutually satis-
factory balance of military strength and contribu-
tions, particularly with respect to the relation-
ship of the Federal Republic of Germany to its
European allies and the relationship of the European
allies to the United States.
(3) The maintenance of democratic institutions and
processes in allied countries as the moral and
political basis of collective defense.
Each of these is either directly or indirectly related to
the military defense of Western Europe. According to Sena-
tors Nunn and Bartlett, "The defense of Europe is our defense
...NATO is the most important of all of America's military
alliances .. .Events on the European continent affect the United




The significance of Italy to the United States has been
addressed earlier. With regard to the strategic importance
of the Mediterranean, various observations can be made.
The Mediterranean Sea is the most heavily traveled maritime
area in the world, and it provides access to the shortest
water route between Europe and the Persian Gulf. The bridges
between Europe, Asia and Africa are washed by the Mediterranean
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Sea and it probes into the Eurasian continent and its
29
southern heartland via the Black Sea.
The U.S. has been accused by the Communist Party of Italy
of meddling in the internal politics and economy of the
country. These denunciations of U.S. interference have
hindered American interactions with Italy and other allied
nations. Because of the negative image caused by such asser-
tions and actions, the American government abstained from
declaring any formal position toward the communists 1 drive
for power. Former Secretary of State Kissinger was outspoken
and adamant in his anti-communist stance and he was supported
by President Ford at the time.
On January 12, 1978, the Carter administration issued
a statement on current U.S. thought relating to West Euro-
pean Communism and the possible rise to power of the Italian
Communists in the upcoming elections. Rationale for such
a statement stemmed from the U.S. strong desire to counter
Italian opinion at the time that the United States was
indifferent to the outcome of the elections. The highlights
of this foreign policy declaration, considered by some politi-
cal experts to be direct warnings to the Italians, are worth
mentioning:
...our European allies are sovereign countries,
and rightly and properly, the decision on how they
are governed rests with their citizens alone... We
believe we have an obligation to our friends and
allies to express our views clearly.
Administration leaders have repeatedly expressed
our views on the issue of Communist participation in
Western European governments. Our position is clear:
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We do not favor such participation and would like
to see Communist influence in any Western European
country reduced.
The United States and Italy share profound demo-
cratic values and interests, and we do not believe
that the Communists share those values and inter-
esiIS*
While the United States recognizes the sovereign nature
of the countries of Western Europe, it also realizes the
high stakes involved in dealing with the Communists in one
of these countries, especially one as essential as Italy.
To understand the gravity of the situation, it is necessary
to be aware of the defense postures and policies of the PCI.
E. THE MILITARY AND DEFENSE POLICIES OF THE PCI
"Italy out of NATO, NATO out of Italy." This was the
manner in which the Italian Communist Party described its
policy toward the Alliance. The PCI vehemently opposed
Italian membership in NATO and continued its critical stance
into the early 19 70's. At the Thirteenth Party Congress in
1972, Enrico Berlinguer commented specifically on the Alli-
ance, speaking of "the struggle against the Atlantic Pact,"
summoning Italy to free itself from "the bond of subordina-
tion... to NATO." Within two years, however, the PCI had
developed a new posture on NATO. In December, 1974, the
Party Secretary made the following statement in his report
to the Central Committee, presenting this "new position":
Insofar as Italy is concerned, we do not pose
as a pre-condition Italian withdrawal from the
Atlantic Alliance. . .We make it clear that we also
believe that the Italian Government must not
undertake a unilateral action that would alter the
military strategic equilibrium between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. 32
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The Italian Communists base their view of NATO on the
supposition that East-West detente requires this balance,
and that the nation is compelled to remain in the U.S.
sphere of influence as a result of her geography, economics
and European history. The Communists are also wise enough
to realize that a neutralist Italian government, dominated
by the PCI, could be confronted with possible reprisals from
NATO, U.S. economic and political leverage and political
pressures from the Soviet Union. The threat of military
intervention by the Soviet Union is another major concern.
The PCI accepts NATO to avoid a significant change in the
European balance and to further its participation in the
33government without inducing intervention by the United States.
Such an intervention by the Soviet Union causes great con-
cern to the PCI as well.
The attitude of the Italian Communist Party on foreign
policy and defense issues has been a major subject of debate
by foreign observers. The opinions expressed by these indi-
viduals fall into two basic categories. Some experts are
skeptical of the PCI's public position on NATO and its
autonomy from Moscow, from past performance. However, they
feel that the PCI should be encouraged to discuss these sub-
jects to formalize its view. Conversely, there are those
who state that the policies of the Italian Communists repre-
sent a stimulating new development, perhaps a turning point
in the history of the Communist movement. It is the view
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of this group that there exist the beginnings of a new
strengthened capability of the West European nations to
defend themselves. While these groups may express differing
views, there is no dissent on the nature and meaning of cur-
rent PCI policies in this area. It is generally felt that
should the PCI come to power, it would not withdraw from the
NATO Alliance; would not demand the removal of NATO bases
and personnel from national soil; and would not reduce defense
34
expenditures. In fact, expanding on this final point, the
Communists' voting record in Parliament confirms that the PCI
has done nothing to weaken Italy's military capacity. On
the contrary, Communist deputies gave strong support to
measures calling for a reorganization of the army, enabling
35it to improve upon its fighting capabilities.
On the recent issue of modernization of NATO's nuclear
weapons arsenal, the PCI voiced a reluctance to accept the
basic premise of the missile program: that the growing
number of Russian SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe upsets the
nuclear balance in . favor of the Soviet Union. Arguing that
the Russians have no aggressive intentions and do not want
to distrub the balance of power, the PCI voted against the
missile program. However, the final Italian vote in NATO
at the December 19 79 meeting was in support of the nuclear
3 fi
modernization plan.
While the Italian Communist leaders have stated their
intention to continue general support of and participation
in the NATO Alliance, there are certain caveats that accompany
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these remarks. Writing in the Communist Party newspaper
L ' Unita , Alberto Jacoviello denounced the Alliance in its
current form, stating that it would be unthinkable that
Italian Communists would accept the Atlantic Pact, "one of
the basic instruments of American interference with the
37politics and economy of our country..." as it now stands.
If the Communists come to power, it is unlikely that
there would follow any dramatic shift in foreign policy
orientation. It is worth recalling that Party Secretary
Berlinguer went out of his way at the East Berlin Communist
conference to inform the participants that the PCI would act
"within the framework of the international alliances to which
38
our country belongs." Of more profound significance was
his remarkable statement in an interview prior to the June
1976 elections, when he declared that the PCI would "feel
more secure" under the protection of NATO. This statement
was the PCI's first public recognition that the national
security interests of Italy were best served by membership
39in NATO. Berlinguer was inferring that it would be easier
to build pluralist socialism under the umbrella of NATO.
Further, the PCI is deeply concerned with possible Soviet
intervention in Italy.
The PCI is inclined to accept NATO on two conditions:
"that there should be no unilateral changes in the actual
balance of power in Europe, another direct reference to the




Europe and the two superpowers be revised." The Italian
Communists feel strongly on these two points, noting that,
"the ultimate objective of such revision must be... the over-
41
coming of the opposing military and political blocs."
The PCI has acknowledged that the Atlantic Alliance must
exist as long as there is a Warsaw Pact. Yet, the Italian
Communists are equally emphatic when they state that NATO
must be "restructured to break the American hegemony, per-
mitting the European members to reestablish their sover-
42
eignty." It is interesting to observe the use of "hegemony",
a term often associated with the Soviet Union. The PCI does
not consider the USSR a threat to Europe, but it does have
very strong negative feelings toward the U.S. It feels that
the real dangers to Italy are U.S. imperialistic ways, as
elements of disruption and instability. Keenly opposed to
such imperialism ( i.e. , U.S. military-industrial complex,
which determines Italian military policy, corrupt business
practices of the Americans, politico-economic conditioning
opposed to unity in Europe, etc.), the Italian Communists,
while exploiting events to their advantage, see the spread
43
of decadence and decline in Europe as caused by U.S. supremacy.
Party leader Berlinguer has expressed his views on the
armed forces of the country. In a report to the Central
Committee in preparation for the Fourteenth Congress of the
PCI, he noted that the Party had long since outgrown its
anti-military attitudes. Italy needs organized, efficient
69

armed forces to guarantee security and national independence.
He stated that the orientation and organization of the
Army, Navy and Air Force should be in line with constitu-
tional principles, that the military cannot be subject to
partisan manipulation. While calling for continued compul-
sory military service, Berlinguer highlighted the need for
improvements in promotions and appointments of personnel.
He emphasized that military spending must be planned to avoid
44
waste and duplication.
It is interesting to analyze the depth and completeness
of Berlinguer' s speech with regard to the military. The
Communists have gone from an active anti-defense, anti-military
posture to one of active interest in the national defense.
The PCI continues to amaze the Italian people by its unique
changes in policy, such as the shift from anti- to pro-NATO,
thereby gaining additional support. In addition, the latest
decision against the nuclear modernization program for NATO
is yet another example of the changing of views on defense
issues
.
In order to analyze any effect the Italian Communists in
government would have on the North Atlantic Alliance, it
is necessary to understand the likelihood of the PCI coming
to power. Various factors are involved in determining the
possibility of such action. These now will be addressed with
a view toward appreciating the significance of this event
should it occur. The consequences of the PCI in governmental
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power can be comprehended only when one is aware of the
structure of the Italian Parliament, realizing the organi-
zational framework of the legislature and the importance of
the numerous positions and ministerial posts. Further, the
recent electoral results will be discussed and analyzed as




V. LIKELIHOOD OF PCI IN POWER
A. DOMESTIC INSTABILITY IN ITALY
Italy is plagued by a progressive deterioration of its
political, economic, administrative and social institutions.
It is this decadence that has aided the Italian Communists
in their quest for power in that they have capitalized on
the weaknesses of the current government. By presenting
attractive alternatives to rescue the nation from continued
economic and political chaos, the PCI has gained the valuable
support of a large segment of the electorate. The Italian
Communists propose economic measures to curtail inflation,
increase productivity and develop more sophisticated tech-
nology while advocating greater political access and involve-
ment in the political process, increasing economic efficiency
with a broadly based political system.
To understand the present economic crisis, it is useful
to examine the Italian economy in the post-war period.
Considered an "economic miracle," the growth in Italy's
economy during the 1950 's and early 1960 's was unquestionably
impressive, rising at an annual rate of almost 6 percent,
2
compared to the 4.5 percent average of Western Europe.
There were substantial gains in the GNP as well, which
3doubled in the twelve year period between 1950 and 19 62,
with the volume of imports more than doubled and exports
4
nearly trebled. Indeed, Italy was quickly acquiring those
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characteristics of a highly advanced industrial society:
a steady growth of output, greater social mobility, moderni-
zation of economic structures, a higher standard of living,
and a shift of labor from the agricultural regions to the
industrial centers. A feeling of prosperity and good fortune
was evident throughout the country.
In recent years, the nation's economy has deteriorated
from the prosperity experienced two decades ago. There are
many factors that have contributed to the current condition.
Notable is the soaring cost of labor which produces infla-
tionary wage levels for Italy's industrial workers. According
to Claire Sterling, the wildcat strikes of 19 69, when over
twelve million workers were on strike between September and
December, severely crippled the government controlled indus-
tries, causing near panic. The result was enormously increased
labor costs which became a primary factor in Italy's economic
upheaval
.
While labor costs have been a chief contributor, other
elements have hindered economic recovery. Giorgio Napolitano,
a member of the Directorate of the PCI with responsibility
for economic policy and social affairs, said that Italy's
difficulties stem from the manner in which the country has
been governed in the past, both before and after the 1968
shift to the left. Highlighting various aspects prior to
that year, Napolitano includes corruption within the program
for urban land speculation, a mistaken use of resources and
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a growing imbalance between the northern and southern sec-
tors of the country. Since 1968, the troubles have deepened
with the intense wage push of 1970, the ramifications of the
1973 oil crisis, a massive increase in public spending and
a general slackening of discipline within all areas of demo-
cratic life, a permissive trend with dangerous consequences,
7
according to Napolitano.
To the list can also be added high levels of inflation
and unemployment, an unfavorable balance of payments, low
industrial productivity, fiscal and financial scandals within
the bureaucracy and an excessive government budget deficit.
Each is an upsetting problem for any country, but, when com-
bined, as in Italy, the affect can be catastrophic.
Not only is Italy burdened with economic anarchy, but
it is also faced with socio-cultural problems which dilute
domestic stability. From this country of small sovereign
units have come major contributions to European art, culture
and society. Historically, however, these sovereign entities
have hindered Italy in the development of a national identity
upon which sound, collective values should be based. In
addition, the public and private sectors which managed economic
growth have failed to assist in the transformation of the
quasi-feudal social structure into one more compatible with
an industrialized economy and its concomitant conditions.
Thus, there has been a dismembering of Italy's traditional
society and massive migrations have further upset the social
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fabric of the country, causing a precarious coexistence of
social groups and classes. Related to these are the appalling
conditions within the large cities: overcrowding of schools,
inadequate transportation systems and severe shortages of
satisfactory housing. Scanning this social morass, one can
understand the deep socio-cultural malaise that is widespread
in Italy.
The Italian educational system needs immediate reform.
Archaic objectives and procedures are still employed in the
schools and universities. Lacking is an efficient modern
system of professional training as well as relief from the
chaotic development of the educational institutions, with
9little updating of structures or procedures. Since 1969,
Italy has witnessed serious student unrest and massive sit-
in demonstrations. Frequent confrontations have occurred
between students and the authorities and even between student
factions. Italy is the only country in Western Europe where
the student agitations of the 19 60's have become a permanent
event.
Perhaps the most frightening of all the factors which
have led to social instability in Italy is the outbreak of
rampant terrorism which has spread across the nation. Just
as the economic problems of the country have been attributed
to the inefficiency of the government, terrorism has become
linked to politics. From the "kneecap" attacks on journalists,
judicial officials and others to the outright execution of a
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major political leader, the radical groups in Italy exert
a formidable influence on the country.
While reform and rejuvenation of the present political
environment may not resolve the problems, there is a
definite need for a change of leadership. With the DC in
majority control for the past three decades, many experts
believe that its continued inefficiency and inability to
cope with the ills of the nation would lead only to further
disintegration. Corruption and scandals within the party
elite are common. Lawrence Gray, writing in Problems of
Communism , notes the deficiencies in the Center-Left Govern-
ment which ruled Italy for fifteen years until 1976. It was
comprised of the DC, the Socialists and minor parties.
Gray notes that these deficiencies can be aggregated into:
(1) disunity and constant factional strife within the coali-
tion government, and (2) an incapability to handle the conse-
quences of disorderly and uneven growth that resulted in
runaway inflation and an economic recession.
"Pragmatism, not ideological purity, lies at the heart
12
of PCI thinking." R.E.M. Irving, an authority on Euro-
pean internal policy matters, continues that with such a
political policy, the Italian Communists have accepted com-
promises and coalitions as the best means of achieving power.
A party with a long and consistent record of commitment to
pluralism and to the Italian road to socialism, the PCI has
emphasized the need to accommodate itself to cultural and
religious traditions of Italy and Western Europe as a whole.
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Following the lead of Antonio Gramsci, the ideological mentor
of the party, the PCI has realized the necessity of a com-
promise between the Communists and the Catholic Church; hence,
"the historic compromise" of 1974. As discussed earlier,
Party Secretary Berlinguer proposed this alliance of the DC
and the PCI in order to form a broad and lasting political
base on which to govern the country. While neither of the
two parties can hope to govern alone, "the historic compro-
mise" has yet to be accepted. However, it could prove to
be a possible solution to Italy's current dilemma.
To comprehend the effects of the PCI in political power,
it is necessary to understand the Italian governmental struc-
ture as well as the constitutional features of the Parliament.
B. STRUCTURE OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
While Italian history dates back thousands of years, the
Republic of Italy is less than thirty-five years old. The
Constitution was drafted by the elected deputies to the first
Constituent Assembly and ratified on December 22, 1947.
Following promulgation five days later, the Constitution
14took effect on January 1, 194 8.
The Italian Republic parallels in some respects other
West European parliamentary democracies in its structure.
Figure 2 illustrates the three-branch governmental organiza-
tion of the Republican state. In theory, the executive
branch with its Council of Ministers is responsible to the





























ss O EhI 2
< H ,Eh 3
W Eh cc o
Cm O p o
Cm w IO o
< 00 io <
I 00M HM< <2 2 5o






I CC fe W W M 1 M1300<0 OOiOOOO
,
















































CC H 2 W •H W O M O 5
< a O CC H s
Ph< 00 < > O
fe cc s.ccts>
< Eh Q WW
>< cc 2 w eh oo i-HW 2 2 cc o W < CC 2 w














Eh 2 1 ooo2 W 1 2 WW 00
I
H W
5 , 9 ^. 2 Eh00M CC w < H
h-1 w M ' En S
CC « Eh 1 oo £
<c S W 3 o









































































although this is not a constitutional requirement. There
is a president whose position is above that of the regular
governmental structure. However, the Italian political sys-
tem operates in a manner unique to the country. Particular
aspects include the lawmaking power of the parliamentary
committees and the fact that "governments are responsible,
though unofficially, to extraparliamentary political parties
rather than to the legislature."
The Parliament of Italy is a bicameral body consisting
of a Senate ( Senato ) and a Chamber of Deputies ( Camera dei
deputati ) . There are 315 senators and 630 deputies, both
popularly elected at least every five years through slightly
different but basically proportional electoral systems.
Specifically, the Chamber of Deputies utilizes multimember
electoral colleges and seats are allocated proportionally by
party list. Senate colleges are single-member in composition
and seats are consigned proportionally in regional colleges.
The exception to this latter procedure is the case of a can-




The Council of Ministers is legally responsible to both
the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. After formation by
nomination of the President of the Republic, the Council
must acquire a vote of confidence from each chamber within
ten days. Further, the cabinet can come to an end in one of
three manners: (1) by resigning on its own initiative,
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(2) by resigning if it loses a vote of confidence in either
chamber, or (3) when parliament is dissolved for new elec-
17tions .
The loss of a vote in one of the chambers on a bill it
has proposed does not constitute the overthrow of that
cabinet. A specific motion of no confidence must be sub-
mitted signed by at least one-third of the members of either
the Senate or the Chamber. A further stipulation requires
that the motion cannot be acted upon until three days after
its presentation. Such action prevents the overthrow of
a government by "sudden death", thereby prohibiting the
opposition from taking advantage of a possible temporary
absence from the floor of the cabinet's supporters or their
temporary dissension.
The Chamber of Deputies is generally thought to be the
more prestigious of the two bodies. Constitutionalists argue
that party leaders prefer the Chamber to the Senate and that
there is a tendency to choose the Prime Minister and the more
significant ministers from the Chamber rather than from the
Senate. Furthermore, they claim that governments consider
votes of no confidence in the Chamber more seriously than
in the Senate. While there is some truth to these arguments,
19
specific cases have been cited to show the contrary. In
addition, as both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies
20
share basically identical legislative powers, one of the
few European legislatures to state such a claim, the distinc-





The powers of the Italian Parliament are conventional
in nature: the passage of laws, the ratification of treaties,
the approval of the national budget, the delegation of rule-
making power to the cabinet and the conduct of investigations.
Certain additional powers involve the joint session of the
Parliament: election of the president of the Republic,
impeachment of cabinet members for crimes committed in the
exercise of their functions, election of one-third of the
members of the Constitutional Court, election of one-third
of the twenty-one elected members of the Superior Council
of the Judiciary and election of sixteen additional judges
to serve on the Constitutional Court in the event of im-
21peachment of a president.
There is almost no limit to what Parliament can act upon.
It sets its own internal rules with the president of each
branch determining the agenda for that branch and assigning
bills to its standing committees. For the government to
achieve priority for its bills, it must first influence these
presidents and the chairmen of the committees. Both houses
are organized into standing committees, each corresponding to
the various areas covered by the different ministerial depart-
ments. (See Figure 2 for the complete listing of these
departments.) There are fourteen standing committees in the
Chamber and eleven in the Senate. Each legislator is a mem-
ber of at least one and generally not more than one committee.
Membership is determined by experience and alleged compe-
tence of the legislators, with ex-ministers on committees
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relating to the subject matter of their former ministry.
22These individuals often serve as chairmen. In addition
to standing committees, each house has an election committee,
a rules committee and a library committee.
In procedure, bills may be introduced by the govern-
ment, from the other house, by an individual member of the
Parliament or by initiative. When a bill is passed to a
standing committee, three types of procedures may be followed
in handling that bill; the committee may act as (1) an
advisory body, (2) a legislative body or (3) a drafting body.
The president of the particular house reviewing the bill
will determine in which capacity the committee is to function
23
on the legislation.
The members of the Chamber and the Senate vote in party
groups. The group spokesman of a particular issue will con-
clude debate on a bill by declaring how his party group will
vote. This form of discipline has not been imposed by the
group caucus but by the party organization outside parlia-
ment, and is enforced by these organizations. On almost all
issues of foreign and domestic policy, legislators follow
the party decision. When there have been rare ruptures of
discipline, the offending parliamentarian must come before
the party control commission or similar group for judgment
and determination of punishment. The latter could range
from a reprimand to expulsion from the party, with there
being varying intermediate penalties.
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Legislative output of the Italian Parliament is in
absolute terms very high and in relative terms substantially-
higher than other West European legislatures. When compared
with that of West Germany, the results are surprising. In
the first West German Parliament (1949-1953) 545 bills were
passed as against 2317 in the first Parliament of Italy
(1948-1953); and 497 and 424 compared with 1897 and 1797
in their respective second and third parliaments. The num-
ber was still significant in the fourth Italian Parliament
25
at 1767.
While Italian legislation tends to be confused, frag-
mentary and conflicting, the exceedingly high productivity
level would be impossible without the recourse to legislation
by committee as both houses spend less than 2 percent of
their time in plenary session on legislation. Furthermore,
75 percent of all legislation passes in committee with 90
percent passing with unanimous support.
While this discussion of the Italian governmental and
parliamentary system does not address all the detailed proce-
dures, it does highlight the significance of the legislative
branch within the total framework. One can note that by
authorizing a lawmaking power to the parliamentary committees,
these committees and their chairmen hold influential posi-
tions within the governmental structure. Further, the Italian
Communists, in recognition of their electoral strength follow-
ing the 19 76 national elections, were given the post of
83

Chamber President and chairs of seven committees, truly an
unprecedented action.
C. THE COMMUNIST VOTER
When compared with other West European Communist Parties,
the PCI is a success story for Communist electoral politics.
In Southern Europe, the Communists have established them-
selves as an important party of the left, notwithstanding
the fact that Communists are well behind the PSOE in Spain
and the Socialists in Portugal, while only marginally behind
the Socialists in France. In Italy, however, the Communists
are ahead of the nearest left party by a significant margin.
Table 4 illustrates the rise in the PCI's popular vote at
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Information from FBIS, No. 109 (5 June 1979), p. L-l.
SOURCE (except 19 79) : Roy Godson and Stephen Haseler,
'Eurocommunism' Implications for East and West (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 22.
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It is beneficial to be aware of the character of the
Italian Communist voter prior to discussing the details of
the latest elections. Three representative indicators are
sex, age and occupation. Whereas Annie Kriegel reports an
increase in the percentage of female membership of the
2 8French Communist Party between 1966 and 1972, there is
little evidence to show any major increase in women's member-
ship within the PCI. Their representation has remained rela-
tively static over the past five years at approximately 2 3
29percent. While the Italian Communists have campaigned
for women's rights ( i.e. , referendum on divorce in 1974 and
liberalization of abortion laws in 1976) , they have been
careful not to alienate themselves from issues relating to
the Catholic Church and the sanctity of family life. All
in all, the Italian Communist Party, like the other Communist
and leftist parties in Western Europe, remains overwhelming
30
male in membership.
On the subject of age, Neil Mclnnes notes that, between
the two world wars, the West European Communist Parties in
general were regularly younger than the corresponding social-
ist parties. He further states that the 1960 *s saw the
Communists overtaken on their left by those younger than
31they. The age of the Communist electorates has dropped
considerably, especially with the passage in the Spring, 19 75
of the new law lowering the age limit for voting from twenty-
five to eighteen. The Italian scholar, Giacomo Sani, partially
attributes the electoral success of the PCI in 1976 to this
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lowering of the age limit. These "new electors" consti-
tuted between 2.0 and 2.2 million votes of the total 12.6
million won by the PCI and corresponds to 38 to 42 percent
of all the ballots cast by this group of voters. Sani states
that "there is little doubt that this [younger voter] was
32
an important component of the PCI's advance." Table 5
represents the results of a study showing the significance
of age with regard to support for the Italian Communist Party
TABLE 5
SUPPORT FOR THE PCI IN











Data from the Sartori-Marradi survey (1975)
SOURCE: Giacomo Sani, "Mass Support for Italian Com-
munism," Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartori, eds . , Euro--
communism: The Italian Case (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978)
,
p. 91.













The Italian Communist Party has been and remains a
predominantly working-class party. Notwithstanding this
fact, the growth of the PCI has been diffused among several
social classes and the party continually strives to recruit
members from the middle classes and the professionals.
During the past twenty years, the social composition of
the Italian Communist electorate has become more hetero-
geneous, drawing voters from various social strata. The
occupational composition of the party membership is depicted
in Table 6.
TABLE 6
OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF PCI MEMBERSHIP
1960 AND 1973























SOURCE: Giuseppe Di Palma, Surviving Without Governing
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 261.
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D. ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS - 19 7 6 AND 19 79
"The June, 1976, national elections demonstrated
unequivocally the end of the center-left formula that had
33
ruled Italy for almost 15 years." According to Pellegrino
Nazzaro, the results of the election made it clear that the
country could no longer be governed without the Communist
Party. Such a development in the political proceedings of
the nation merits careful consideration and analysis as it
proved that "in Italy democracy is no longer possible through
the formula of keeping half a nation in power and half in
„34
opposition.
The electoral climate surrounding the 1976 elections was
exceedingly tense. In his analysis of the parliamentary
elections, Joseph LaPalombara writes in Italy at the Polls
that a number of factors contributed to the sense of fore-
boding that many in Italy and abroad expressed about the
elections. ~ Among these factors was the economic crisis
with the unemployment level unmatched since the early 1950 ' s
and skyrocketing inflation surpassing the 20 percent mark.
The balance of payments was so out of line that the Italian
lira was sliding toward record lows. The rate of Italian
economic growth was one of the lowest in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) . Italy's internal
production, consumption and monetary and fiscal patterns were
very disturbing to other countries and financial institutions.
These economic ills received broad coverage in the news media,
with three observations appearing evident to the Italians:
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(1) the government showed signs of being unable or unwilling
to cope with the crisis; (2) the trade unions refused to
accept economic regeneration measures whose burden would
fall mostly on the working class; and (3) the Communist Party
appeared to be the only major political party with the will
3 fi
and the power to move into this economic morass.
Other factors causing the tense atmosphere were ram-
pant political scandals, radicalization with escalated
terrorist attacks and indiscriminate bombings and the basic
37failure of measures of reform and renewal. While politi-
cal scandals have long been a staple of Italian politics,
they rose to frightening levels in the 1970 's. Neither the
government, the military, nor political parties, to mention
a few, were immune to the spread of scandals and corruption.
The prime example of the extent of these scandals is the
direct involvement of President Leone in the Lockheed Corpora-
tion pay-off. The acceptance of large sums of money to
induce the sale of aircraft to the government led to Leone's
resignation in June, 1978.
A final and certainly not the least significant factor
affecting the electoral climate was the possibility that the
38
PCI would come to power. While the 1972 elections showed
that prospect to be quite remote ( i.e. , the Communists
received less than 30 percent of the vote for the lower
chamber), the results confirmed several interesting patterns.
First, while there were more than ten political parties in
Italy in 1972, two of these groups, the PCI and the DC,
89

accumulated approximately two-thirds of the vote, thus
resulting in a basically two-party system. A second obser-
vation showed that the PCI continued its slow but linear
rise in electoral appeal. While the PCI had the majority
of its voter support in the northern and central regions
thirty years ago, the 1972 results showed a broadening of
its electoral following to other areas of the country.
Table 7 highlights the regional voting pattern for the PCI
in the elections of 1946, 1972 and 1976.
TABLE 7
ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE





(in percentages) (in percentage
points)
Region 1946 1972 1976
North 22.4 26.5 33.5 11.1
Central 24.7 34.4 41.4 16.7
South 10.8 24.4 32.4 21.6
Islands 10.2 22.2 29.5 19.3
SOURCE: Joseph LaPalombara, "Italian Elections as
Hobson's Choice," Howard R. Penniman, ed. Italy at the Polls
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1977) , p. 10.
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A third pattern which developed was the apparent growing
electoral schism between the PCI and the Socialist parties,
the latter being the Proletarian Socialists, the Socialist
Party itself and the Democratic Socialists. This tendency
of the Communists to capture larger and larger proportions
of the left vote caused consternation among many Italians.
Just as the PCI has improved its position relative to the
voting public, the PSI has suffered a calamitous decline in
electoral support. Those Italians who fear the growth of
the left are all the more dismayed as it is the Communist
39
component that is growing.
With the dissolution of the Parliament in April, 1976,
President Leone called for national elections June 20-21.
The campaign centered on the strategies of the Christian
Democrats and the Communists. The DC, led by party chairman
Benigno Zaccagnini, put forward a 14-point platform ranging
from socioeconomic reforms to international commitments.
However, the heart of the platform focused on the possibility
of Communist participation in post-election government coali-
tions. Although the Christian Democrats opposed a govern-
ment including all parties of the constitutional spectrum,
they especially objected to the Communists sharing cabinet
seats. Their hope was for the Communists to agree to a
40formal role in shaping policy from outside.
The main emphasis of the PCI's campaign strategy focused




expression of the popular and working classes." While
criticizing the Christian Democrats and their abstract way
of managing the political process and problems, the PCI
advocated efficiency and good government, with a party
42
slogan of "serving in the government to serve the people."
The party platform called for a post-election government of
"national emergency" including all parties. Party leader
Berlinguer voiced opposition to a Christian Democrat-Socialist
coalition government. This statement produced further loss
of credibility and political prestige to the already suffer-
ing Socialist Party.
The outcome of the 1976 election produced a strong
polarization of votes for the two major parties with the
DC losing 0.1 percent of the votes and four seats in the
Chamber of Deputies. In the Senate, they gained 0.8 percent
but lost one seat. It was the Communists who scored the
biggest victories. They jumped from 27.1 percent and 179
seats in 1972 to 34.4 percent and 228 seats in the Chamber.
The PCI gains carried over into the Senate with an increase
from 27.6 percent and 94 seats in 1972 to 33.8 percent of
43the vote and 116 seats. To gain a clear understanding of
the status of each party and its electoral support, Table
8 shows the breakdown for the general elections of 1972 and
1976 by political party and parliamentary house. The compari-
son of the two election year results illustrates the substan-
tial gain made by the Communist Party. The figures also
92
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point out the fact that the smaller parties, especially the
PSDI and MSI-DN, suffered substantial losses.
Robert Putnum, writing in International Organization /
analyzed the Italian political scene and presented three
reasons to support his theory that the thirty-year period
of exclusion of the PCI from a formal role in national deci-
sion making is drawing to a close. He stated that this
transformation of Italian politics is likely to continue
44for the following reasons:
(1) the electoral trends that strengthened the
PCI's hand reflect not merely passing gusts of
government unpopularity, but more fundamental
transformation of patterns of partisanship and
social mobilization,
(2) at all levels within the Italian political
and economic elites, barriers to collaboration
with the Communists have dramatically declined
in the last several years, and
(3) solving Italy's grave economic problems -
immense government deficits, unsustainable labor
costs, severe underinvestment and structural rigidi-
ties and distortions - will require painful sacri-
fices that are possible politically only for a
government with broad popular and parliamentary
support. Without PCI forbearance, Italy would
rapidly become ungovernable.
Following the 1976 elections, the Italian people were
looking for a political system that would include the work-
ing masses without regard to ideological differences. The
Christian Democrats felt driven to re-examine national
priorities, placing more importance on urgent social and
economic problems rather than on the ideological differences
that had caused the confrontation with the Communists. In
like manner, the Communists needed to reassure larger sectors
94

of the population that they would respect Italian democracy
45
as promised. For seventeen months after the June, 1976
elections, the Communists refrained from voting against the
government. In December 19 77, Berlinguer threatened to
force a general election unless the PCI were given posts
in a "government of national emergency." In March, 1978, the
Communists were allowed to vote in the parliamentary elec-
tions, rather than just abstaining from voting against.
However, the PCI continued its drive for active and direct
participation in the Cabinet of the Andreotti government.
The Communists withdrew their support of the government in
January, 1979. After unsuccessful attempts at forming another
government , the parliament was dissolved in April, 19 79, with
new national elections scheduled for June 3-4. While there
was no real winner in those elections, there was a loser:
the Communist Party. The PCI support of the Christian Demo-
cratic government between 1976 and 19 79 may have contributed
to its defeat. The effects of that period of responsibility
without power were severely felt by the Communists: the
party's membership dropped by 24,000 in 1978; local elections
registered major swings away from the Communists; and pre-
election political opinion polls predicted that the Radical
Party and the far-left Proletarian Democracy Party would
46gather the support of disillusioned Communist idealists.
Predictions were accurate in that the PCI lost 4.0 per-
cent of the votes won in 1976. In addition, it lost 19 seats
95

in the Chamber of Deputies. Losses were suffered in the
industrialized north, especially in Turin, where the party
lost 8.0 percent of its previous support. In the south,
especially in Naples, the loss was 8.0 percent from the
last election. The losses were heavy in the Chamber, with
its minimum voting age of 18, indicating an Italian youth
44
sector somewhat disenchanted with the Communist Party line.
Table 9 presents the final results of the general
election of 1979, showing the votes accumulated by each of
the parties , the percent and the number of seats in both
the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. It is interesting
to compare these gains and losses with the outcome in the
1976 election, also shown in Table 9.
With this background of the current political atmosphere
in Italy and the understanding of the likelihood of the
PCI gaining a position of power in the government, it is
logical to analyze the effects of Eurocommunism, notably
Italian Communism, on the NATO Alliance. The effects are
varied with some proving to be more adverse than others.
Each deserves individual analysis considering the signifi-
cance of the subject and the alternatives available to the
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VI. EFFECTS OF PCI PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ON NATO
A spectral analysis of the ways in which Eurocommunism,
and specifically the participation in government of the
Italian Communist Party, could affect the North Atlantic
Alliance reveals several interesting aspects. From one end
of the spectrum with no effect on NATO, one can trace the
options to the extreme end with Italy out of NATO.
This chapter presents a variety of effects, postulated
by others, of PCI accession to power on the NATO Alliance.
The views of the author are reserved to the concluding por-
tion of this work.
To study specific effects, it is necessary to discuss
the various elements involved and the options available.
Some are more damaging than others with limited accepta-
bility under unique circumstances while others are minimal
in severity, causing only slight disturbance to the member
nations of NATO. An appreciation of this degree of variance
will enable one to understand more fully the depth of the
situation and the options that can be employed to resolve
any potential difficulty.
A. EFFECTS OF PCI PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ON U.S.
INTERESTS IN NATO
PCI participation in government could affect the NATO
Alliance and related U.S. interests in a variety of ways.
The presence of Communists in positions of influence and
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authority in Italy could affect its defense contributions
and policies toward NATO. The amount of government funds
dedicated to the Alliance has been decreasing recently in
some allied countries as well as in Italy. Should the PCI
attain power, this defense contribution could be altered.
This subject was addressed in more detail in an earlier sec-
tion when PCI defense policies were analyzed.
Another effect of PCI participation in government, one
that warrants careful consideration, is the anticipated response
of allies with Communists in power or participating in the
government to Soviet aggression against other members of
the Alliance, or against neighboring countries such as Yugo-
slavia. At a press conference in June 1976 and again in
1979, PCI leader Berlinguer was asked what the response would
be of the Communist ministers in the Italian government to a
conflict in the Mediterranean and the use of Italian terri-
tory by NATO or Warsaw Pact forces as a support and supply
base for naval and air units. Berlinguer 's response was
more ambiguous than definitive. He stated that the foremost
duty of the Italian government should be to work actively
toward preventing the possibility of the conflict. He con-
tinued by explaining that, in his opinion, any such conflict
could signify the outbreak of a general nuclear war. Then,
there would be no problem because this would lead to the
destruction of mankind. Therefore, the real problem lies in
2prevention. In the event of a conflict in Europe involving
the Soviets, the Italian Communists have consistently stressed
99

the depth of the PCI's commitment to NATO, while emphasizing
the fact that the question is purely hypothetical. While
not asserting the inevitability of a nuclear war, as in the
previous scenario, the PCI leaders state that, with detente,
an East-West military conflict in Europe is practically
3impossible. However, the recent events in Afghanistan may
unsettle this PCI certainty.
The participation of the PCI in Italy's government may
affect the U.S. military role in NATO, especially the sta-
tioning of American armed forces on the European continent
and the U.S. use of naval and air bases. The United States
maintains sizeable military and civilian forces in Italy.
With the PCI in control of the country, there is the possi-
bility that these personnel could be ousted should Italy
decide to sever its ties with the NATO Alliance. Although
this option is unlikely, there is always the chance that
conditions could change based on Italian Communist statements
regarding continued participation in NATO.
Linked to this possible consequence of PCI participation
in government is U.S. military and economic support to Italy.
There had been substantial and consistent financial assistance
given to the Christian Democratic government since World War
II, primarily to keep the Communist Party out of the ruling
administration. While this aid from the United States has
been declining lately, there has been an increase in assist-
ance from the European Economic Community. Were the Italian
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Communist Party to gain power in a future government, it
would be difficult to convince the American public and the
Congress to continue a policy of financial support to Com-
munist Italy. Withholding such funds would injure the sickly
economy of Italy, but the presence of an influential Communist
Party would be upsetting to the United States and its allied
nations
.
The military balance and politically cohesive structure
of NATO would be effected by Communists holding key offices
in the Italian government. The NATO Alliance is based on a
policy of mutual trust, respect and understanding toward
other member nations. Were one of the group to allow the
control of the country by a Communist party which supported
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and was dominated
by the Soviet Union, the others would think that their national
security and the unity and cohesion of the Alliance as a
defense structure were in jeopardy. The PCI shows no direct
signs of being controlled by the Russians. Rather it pro-
fesses democratic principles and may not be as threatening
as a more pro-Soviet Communist Party, such as the PCF and
its recent actions
.
The effects of Eurocommunism discussed here resemble the
main issues raised by the former Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger, in his first major foreign policy address after
leaving office. Analyzing the ramifications of Communist
accession to power in allied governments, Kissinger offered
4four significant consequences. First, the character of the
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Alliance would become confused to the American people and,
Kissinger contends, over time, the participation of the Com-
munists will undermine the moral and political basis for
U.S. troop deployment in Western Europe. The American people
would be asked to continue their support of and commitment
to the NATO Alliance on the basis of two highly uncertain,
untested assumptions: "that there is a new trend of Communism
which will in time split from Moscow, and that the West will
be able to manipulate the new divisions to its advantage."
A second consequence is the effect of Eurocommunism on
Alliance cohesion. Kissinger stated that it would be gen-
erally disastrous, and warned that, regardless of how indepen-
dent these parties may be from the control of the Kremlin,
they can be expected to demonstrate their basic Communist
convictions on international issues, thereby upsetting the
whole matter of foreign policy. Such may have been true
prior to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but that
major event caused outcries from some West European Communist
Parties, especially the Italian Communist Party. Kissinger
further noted that the strong role played by the U.S. allies
in defending Western interests throughout the world could not
be expected from a nation where Communists share in govern-
mental power.
Third, the military strength of NATO and the unity of
the Alliance would be gravely weakened. Kissinger believes
that it is merely "lip service" that the West European
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Communist Parties pay to NATO. If Communists were to share
power, he continues, it is hard to imagine how the present
NATO structure could continue, with its integrated military
planning, political consultation and exchange of highly
classified material if Communists had a major share of power
in a member's government.
Finally, the progress toward European unity may be
undermined, as may be the solidarity of the Alliance. From
an initial position of opposition toward the European Common
Market, the PCI and the PCF have come to accept the European
Community as a fact of life. Kissinger states that the West
European Communists would tend to reorient the Common Market
towards closer relations with the state economies of Eastern
Europe and toward the more extreme of the Third World's
demands for a "new international economic order." The
assumption can be made, according to the former Secretary of
State, that they will not encourage European political unity
to stimulate cooperation with the U.S.; instead they will
urge it toward Third World tendencies. Over time, the govern-
ments with Communists sharing power will pull the others
towards them or deep fissures within the European Community




Kissinger, his hard-line attitude toward Communism and
his gloomy prognosis for Western Europe have come under
attack by writers who differ with his views. A representative
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example is the rebuttal of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., writing
in Current . In countering the main issues raised by the
former Secretary, Mr. Schlesinger disputes the theory that
Communist participation in working democratic governments
would destroy the "moral base" of the NATO Alliance. While
Kissinger was in office, he argues, that "moral base" -
civil freedom and government by consent - had to endure and
to survive not authoritarian elements in democratic govern-
ments but actual dictatorships, as was the case in Greece
g
and Portugal.
Schlesinger goes on to dispute the Kissinger prognosis
for Western Europe: "Communist participation leading to
Communist domination, the dissolution of NATO, the end of
Atlantic unity, the extension of Soviet control to the Eng-
lish Channel and a massive upset in the global power balance
If such were the case, then the best remedy would be the
sternest of actions against the West European Communists.
However, Schlesinger continues with criticism of Kissinger's
solution to the problem. While Kissinger concluded that the
United States must refrain from doing anything that could
lend legitimacy to Eurocommunism and offered no stronger
recommendations, Schlesinger claims that the disproportion
between diagnosis and cure appears futile as well as unrealis-
tic.
On the subject of exchange of classified NATO information,
Ciro Zoppo presents an interesting argument that dispels




notes that the most disruptive threat to NATO cohesion has
been possible PCI access to "NATO secrets." While such
may be the case, he argues that it does not follow that the
PCI would engage in military espionage for the Soviet Union
merely because they are Communists. He further points out
that PCI participation in government is not synonymous with
a takeover of the government. The party leaders have made
it known that they do not seek either the Ministry of Defense
or the Ministry of the Interior, nor will they be given such
posts
.
Of paramount importance is the fact that the PCI does
not and, as far as can be seen, will not have political
aspirations that would justify its taking the risks involved
in passing NATO military secrets to Soviet intelligence.
Such acts of espionage, if discovered, could have extremely
serious consequences for the PCI ' s political future. Zoppo
summarizes his argument by noting that the problem of NATO
secrets and the PCI may be more psychological and political
12than operational.
As an indirect reinforcement to Kissinger's statements,
the results of a NATO study conducted in early 1978 show
that serious attention must be given to the Italian situation
13Reported in The New York Times , * the study highlights vari-
ous NATO-related actions which would either be implemented
immediately or would be strongly recommended if the PCI were
to control the government.
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The military consequences of any Italian withdrawal from
the Alliance were addressed, also. Among the reactions noted
was the immediate cutoff of information provided Italy on
strategic and tactical nuclear targets in Eastern Europe.
Next was the curtailment of information on U.S., British and
French nuclear planning and weapons production, along with
ousting of Italy from participation in the Nuclear Planning
Group (NPG) . An alternative to expulsion from the NPG is
the possibility of a "gentleman's agreement" whereby the
Italian representatives to NATO would excuse themselves
voluntarily from such a sensitive forum.
As a result of the nuclear weapons deployed in the coun-
try, the Italian government maintains an input into NATO's
nuclear planning. Specifically, there are three batteries
of nuclear-tipped Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft missiles located
around Padua. In addition, northern Italy holds F-104
fighter bombers with nuclear bombs and a missile brigade
equipped with Lance and Pershing medium-range surface-to-
surface missiles. In fact, the U.S. has extensive nuclear
warheads in storage in Italy, both for its own use and as a
14NATO reserve.
The NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (.NADGE). system
is essential to Italy's own security and also integrates
Italy's radar, military communications and weapons systems
with those of the other NATO nations. While NATO would proba-
bly want to keep NADGE intact under future Italian governments,
the Italians, under a Communist coalition government, could
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withdraw from this defense project concerned with early
warning of and response to hostile aircraft and missiles.
Another contingency noted in the NATO study is the
transfer of the headquarters of AFSOUTH from Naples to
another allied country. Communist entry into the government
could also force a review of the deployment of the Sixth
Fleet and other NATO naval forces operating in Italian
waters. Naval authorities speculate that the movement of
warships and replenishment vessels supporting the Sixth Fleet
is presently being reported to the Communists by their agents
With Communists in the government, they would have access
to prior information on such movements, thereby possibly
reducing the effectiveness of NATO naval deployments in the
Mediterranean. However, as noted previously in Zoppo '
s
work, the probability of such espionage acts appears remote
due to the penalties if exposed.
The study reported "the worst possible case" as that
in which the 11,000 military personnel of the U.S. stationed
in Italy would have to be withdrawn, and naval operations
16
shifted to the western basin of the Mediterranean.
In response to the question, "will Communist participa-
tion in the government. . .of Italy weaken NATO?" Godson and
17Haseler offer various thought-provoking answers. If Italy
was to withdraw from the Alliance, most likely under Com-
munist promptings, NATO would become basically a "North
American/North European defense pact," relying primarily
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upon a U.S. /West German accord. As former Secretary-
Kissinger noted, "This specter could then be used in other
West European countries to undermine what remains of Atlan-
18tic cohesion." Of equal importance would be the psychologi-
cal shock to the Alliance. NATO would appear to be gravely
weakened and anti-Soviet intentions would deteriorate. With
this climate of gloom over the Alliance, the other NATO
nations, including West Germany, could be easily swayed into
seeking separate deals with the Soviet Union as a means
19
of limiting the blow to their security.
A more realistic assumption of what might occur would
be that, upon entering the government, the Italian Communists
would not insist upon a withdrawal from NATO. In fact, as
noted earlier, General Secretary Berlinguer has stated
clearly that he does not propose a unilateral withdrawal of
Italy from the Atlantic Alliance. Rather the Italian Com-
munists have strong feelings regarding the reforming of the
existing organization. Notwithstanding this fact, the PCI
in government could pose security problems for the Alliance
and could possibly propose reductions in defense expendi-
tures. On the latter issue, the pressure which the United
States could exert upon Italy and its Communist government
20
to retain its defense spending level would be minimal.
A profound precedent would be set if the PCI rose to
power in a future Italian government. For the first time,
NATO would have within its council a member nation whose
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professed aim and ambition is "the dissolution of both NATO
and the Warsaw Pact, the removal of all foreign bases from
European soil, and the resolution of conflict by an all-
21European security conference." According to Godson and
Haseler, the political unity of the Alliance will suffer
with divisions between the European member nations over these
European policy questions.
This type of disparity among the NATO countries would
lead to a misunderstanding on the part of Americans as to
why the United States should support, in a defense pact,
one Communist nation against other Communist nations. Con-
fusion would result which would lead to a reduction of
American resolve and a possible isolation based upon an
American disenchantment with European politics. The U.S.
would be more inclined to support "a truncated NATO" rather
than one in which Communist governments participate.
According to Godson and Haseler,
...the entry of Communists into NATO governments
would make more likely a potentially fatal double
fracture of the Alliance: the first between the
northern and southern members, the second between
Western Europe and the United States. 22
What would result from such fissiparous inclinations
within NATO would be a devastating destabilization of the
entire international system. A threat to peace would be
unavoidable. If the United States were to carry its disaffec-
tion with Europe to the point of troop withdrawals or other
acts of reduced American commitment, a power vacuum would be
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created. While historically cautious in action, the Soviet
Union could be drawn into this vacuum. Another option could
be the establishment of a West European defense program by
the remaining non-Communist nations of NATO. However, there
would be little doubt that such action would be interpreted
23by the Soviet Union as provocative.
The importance to NATO of Italy's strategic geographi-
cal location in the Mediterranean has been addressed pre-
viously. From a military point of view, Admiral Horacio
Rivero, USN, Retired, presented a startling picture of
probable consequences to the Alliance of Communist domination
of the Italian government. At a conference on the political
stability of Italy, Admiral Rivero proclaimed
He who controls Italy controls the Mediterran-
ean .. .Control of the Mediterranean means the
ability to use the sea and the air above it in
war. The bases in Italy and the Italian naval
and air forces are needed for an effective de-
fense of the Mediterranean against the surface
and submarine threats that now exist. 24
The PCI in a position of power would result in an
effective neutralization of Italy, according to Admiral
Rivero. What follows would be the eviction of NATO head-
quarters in charge of the defense of southern Europe and the
ouster of the U.S. headquarters responsible for anti--
submarine and submarine operations. The Admiral carries
his analysis a step further by declaring
The early collapse of the entire southern flank
would become inevitable and even the military
balance in the central region of Europe would
be adversely affected by the diversion to that




The former Commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe
continues his warning with the observation that the defense
of Greece and Turkey would become increasingly difficult
with a neutral Italy. These NATO nations can be effectively
defended only by "the introduction of massive air power"
which Rivero believes can only be from the United States.
Such defenses could be available only if Spain and/or France
provided refuelling facilities, a "very unlikely possi-
bility." 26
This military prognosis detailed by Admiral Rivero pre-
sents an alarming scenario for future NATO activity without
the participation of the critically important Italy. His
analysis is based upon the neutralization of Italy if the
PCI participated in the government, an assumption which may
not hold true. The disconcerting possibility of such an
event becoming reality causes grave concern to the members of
NATO and the United States policy makers. However, the pic-
ture of gloom is not a certainty by any means. NATO with-
out the active role of Italy is only one possible alterna-
tive if the Italian Communists rise to power. Other options
are noteworthy and bear mention at this time.
B. ALTERNATIVES TO THE NATO ALLIANCE
Dr. Eric Willenz, an executive officer in the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research for External Affairs, Depart-
ment of State, shared a most interesting observation in an
interview. He stated that, according to the PCI leader,
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Berlinguer, "the problem in the NATO Alliance as well as
the Warsaw Pact is that you cannot build the type of Social-
27ism you want in either." This brings to mind that, if
the Communists do attain power, there may well be a definite
need to consider alternatives to the NATO Alliance. To
protect the security of the Alliance and to maintain the best
degree of cohesion of the Pact, the members of NATO would
be wise to foresee difficulties in the near future and pre-
pare to face the possibility of Communists among their ranks
and at their conference tables.
An informative report has been written by J.E. Dougherty
and D.K. Pfaltzgraff in conjunction with the Institute for
2 8Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts.
In their study, the authors discuss Eurocommunism and the
policy implications for the Alliance. They have provided
an in-depth analysis of the the future of NATO, and the
major points of their work will be addressed here.
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff point out that NATO has a
history of suffering from internal dissension covering a
wide spectrum of issues. The development of Eurocommunism
and the challenges posed by it create special implications
for NATO institutions. If the PCI were to enter the govern-
ment, there would be a need for NATO to devise new institu-
tional forms to cope with the inherent difficulties raised
by Communists in political power. "Composed of national
governments reflecting increasingly divergent domestic
structures, NATO is constrained to act at the lowest common
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denominator of agreement. Eurocommunism is likely to lower
29that common denominator for action."
The Eurocommunism issue has presented the United States
with a delicate predicament. On the one hand, it would like
to maintain the NATO Alliance as a valuable, effective
implement for the defense of Western Europe and the United
States. However, on the other hand, there is the obviously
devastating effect upon Alliance cohesion and solidarity
which Eurocommunism could cause. The United States recog-
nizes this consequence and is faced with the dilemma of
deciding whether to tolerate in NATO the presence of govern-




In the context of alternatives to NATO in its present
form, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff offer five different approaches
which can be pursued. First, there can be the consolidation
of NATO and/or U.S. facilities in the member nation. In
order to present a "lower profile" in the allied country,
forces can be regrouped and bases consolidated to reduce the
visibility of the NATO units. Where political ramifications
negatively outweigh the military utility of the bases, the
United States could consider withdrawing from these particu-
lar facilities. In Italy, if the PCI decided to reduce the
role of Italy in the Alliance, such palliatives would do
no more than delay the dismantling of the NATO structure.
Second, withdrawal by a government under Communist
influence or control could be encouraged by the other allied
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nations. A key factor in this situation is the relative
strength of the Italian Communist Party vis-a-vis the other
political parties. Because of the power and size of the PCI,
it is doubtful that its position within the government could
be reversed, thus decreasing the possibility of such an
alternative. Should the Italian Communists continue to
consolidate their power and precipitate obstructive behavior
within the Alliance, thereby posing a threat to its activi-
ties, the United States could be compelled to encourage the
voluntary withdrawal of the Communist government. If such
action were unfavorably received, the next step could be the
expulsion from the NATO Alliance.
"Quarantine" within NATO of a government whose loyalty
to the purposes of the Alliance is in doubt is a third
alternative. While this option worked well in Portugal's
case, it would not be applicable to Italy because of the
greater involvement of the Italians in NATO's more sensitive
groups, as well as the importance of the country's strategic
location in the Mediterranean. Another factor is the differ-
ence in character of these two Communist parties. Boycott
of Italy could cause serious political and psychological
consequences to the fabric of the Alliance. It would be
necessary to renegotiate the North Atlantic Treaty to pro-
vide for fuller or lesser degrees of participation within
the Alliance. More problems would be created than solved
by such action. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff describe it,
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The classification of members in a 'multi-tier'
structure would enjoy little prospect of support
in the legislature of member states. Indeed, the
definition of members as belonging to one category
or another might present nearly insurmountable
problems and hold potential for disagreement, dis-
satisfaction, and protracted negotiations among
Alliance members .1
This option may sound unattractive and infeasible: however,
it may be the best of those offered.
A fourth alternative open to NATO is to expel a Commun-
ist government, but not the member country, from the NATO
Alliance. Considered a "damage-limiting" option, where no
country would have to shoulder the burden of forcibly evicting
a country from the Alliance , this method allows NATO to con-
duct its business as usual and prevent the passing of sensi-
tive materials out of the Pact orbit. At the same time, this
option would permit "the Alliance door" to remain open to a
successor government. While isolating the Communist govern-
ment, this approach affirms NATO support to the non-Communists
in the country. Further, there is no provision in the North
Atlantic Treaty for the expulsion of a member state from
NATO. This action may prove infeasible for this reason as
well as the fact that "NATO might lack the necessary con-
32
sensus for such drastic surgery."
The fifth option presented by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff
is to conclude bilateral agreements with those West European
countries that are willing to provide satisfactory terms
for the United States in return for a defense guarantee.
In the event that the other options fail to produce the
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desired effect, this method could be employed. However,
the prospects of safeguarding European interests are severely
diminished if all other options are unsuccessful. By
exercising this fifth option, a profound fragmentation occurs,
dividing the countries into three groups: (1) those still
hanging on to the protective shield and power of the United
States; (2) "quasi-neutral" countries which continue to
have nominal ties with the U.S. but dilute the strong defense
posture, becoming somewhat innocuous in their defense poli-
cies; and, (3) "neutral" countries, which would include those
33
nations with Communists in their government.
In addition to the suggested alternatives for a future
NATO, another can be added that resembles the final one
posed by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. The "two-tier alliance,"
as discussed by a Department of State officer in the NATO
34division, could be created when Communists entered the
government. Such action could produce a schism within the
Alliance. On one side would be the "true allies", and on
the other side, there would be the "so-so" types who were
not totally committed to the Alliance, for whatever reason.
This would be the worst case because of the irrevocable
damage done to the structure of NATO. The possibility of
reconstructing the Alliance to some valid state would be
., 35
nil.
It can be seen that the various postulated effects of
Eurocommunism and Italian Communism in particular upon the
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NATO Alliance range the gamut in degree of severity and
consequential repercussions. While all are basically
hypothetical at this stage and course in history, it is
very important to have contingency plans and alternatives
formulated in the event that action would be necessary,






The Communist Party of Italy is large, powerful and
historically rooted in a country which has been a close ally
of the United States for over thirty years. Italy is one
of the most vital nations in the NATO Alliance, providing
a strategic location in the southern flank. The Italian
Communists steadily increased their electoral support from
the early 1940s until 1979. Notwithstanding the setback
in the 1979 elections, the PCI is active and continues to
speak out on issues of concern to its membership and to all
Italians. As Berlinguer noted, the country will still
have to reckon with the Communists.
The United States government appreciates the sovereign
nature of the nations of Western Europe and recognizes the
need to develop a more flexible foreign policy toward these
countries. The United States government has no misconception
that it can coerce the people of Italy, by whatever means,
be it economic, military or political, into voting a particu-
lar way in a national or regional election. It is the respon-
sibility and the duty of the Italian people to choose between
a Communist, non-Communist or mixed government. Therefore,
there is little in the way of specific direct action that




However, as previously noted, the United States can
develop a more relaxed foreign policy toward the Communists
in Italy. As such, the American government should make
every effort to avoid overt and covert political interven-
tion in Italy and the other democratic countries on the
continent. The United States should avoid using economic
involvement as a tactic of force and pressure, but rather
as an incentive. By developing a more tolerant attitude,
the United States would be in a position to use its influence
in achieving certain vital tasks: the continued partici-
pation of Italy in a Western economic framework, deterence
of Soviet presence in whatever manner, preservation of free
institutions and a democratic political system, and con-
tinued cooperation and participation in the NATO Alliance.
Another necessary change in present policy involves
increased U.S. efforts to communicate with diverse political
groups, especially on the non-Communist left. Overall, the
United States needs to pursue a foreign policy and political
role that confronts present and future realities in Western
2Europe.
The American government cannot afford to be intransigent
toward the Italian Communists and the political calculus
in Italy. A policy of non-compromise would require the U.S.
to support the most anti-Communist factions in the Christian
Democratic Party. These same elements within the DC
want to block reform of the current corrupt practices which
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have contributed to the present crisis and to the rise in
popularity of the Communists. Ultimately, the DC would
become an ineffective constraint on the Communists in a
coalition government and might be excluded from government,
should the leftist parties acquire a sufficiently large
3parliamentary majority to rule with the DC.
A second cost of intransigence is the alienation of
pro-American sectors of Italian public and elite opinion.
These same sectors represent the critical social support
for those groups in the PSI and the DC which are capable
of balancing the strength of the Communists. A third risk
of intransigence toward the PCI is that it may weaken the
ability of the Italian Communists to maintain their autonomy
from the Soviet Union. To gain such independence from
Russian authority, the Party has had to combat considerable
resistance within its ranks and to initiate a massive educa-
tion program to alter the members ' conception of "prole-
tarian internationalism." Were the United States unwilling
to accept a role in the government for the PCI, this weaken-
4mg of its autonomy could result.
When asked what the United States response would be to
Communist participation in the Italian government, a senior
official of the Policy Planning Division of the Department
of State responded by saying that there is "no real answer"
or contingency plan. The American government has formulated
no plan of action, according to Dr. Anton De Porte, because
such a move would appear to add credence to the Communists'
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drive for power and could signify that the United States has
accepted the inevitability of PCI participation in govern-
ment. He emphasized that it was in the U.S. interest to
maintain "a decent relationship" with the Communists. Dr.
De Porte did speculate that the U.S. could "shock the Italians
into throwing out the PCI." Measures used to accomplish
this task include the cutting back of funds and loans to
Italy, making an example of the country and (while this
alternative appears drastic as well as highly unlikely, as
previously mentioned) , the threat of expulsion of Italy from
the North Atlantic Alliance.
Differing Western responses were offered by a Department
of State European analyst who stressed that his opinions were
in no way the official policy of the Department or the Carter
Administration. In his view, there are three alternatives
to counter the effect to NATO of Communists in the Italian
government: (1) force Italy out of the Nuclear Planning
Group and cut off the flow of information to her, (2) seek
a quiet agreement, and (3) conduct "business as usual." The
first option is considered conspicuous and embarrassing to
the Italians and could generate a retaliation from the Com-
munist Party ( i.e. , the ouster of U.S. /NATO military armed
forces from Italy, removal of nuclear weapons from Italian
territory, etc.). An alternative could prove to be diffi-
cult in that we would not be at all sure that the Italian
Communists would agree quietly to stay out of sensitive areas
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and meetings. The most likely option is probably the third,
7the "business as usual" approach.
The so-called bottom line to the question of Communist
participation rests with the voters of Italy. In fact, the
United States could do very little if anything to influence
the outcome of such a situation. This Communist challenge
can be overcome with able Western leadership and cohesion.
In conjunction with Lieber's theories introduced earlier,
Kissinger presented possible courses of action for America.
He declared that the role of the United States is vital in
encouraging an attitude of resolve and conviction. The
American government must recognize the problems that could
ensue with the Communists in power and must understand the
decision this will impose on the United States. The American
leaders need to avoid the impression that we believe Com-
munist success to be inevitable. The U.S. should refrain
from association or consultation with Communist leaders.
Finally, the policies of the United States toward its allies
should be executed in a manner that strengthens the moderate,
gprogressive and democratic governments of Western Europe.
While these proclamations of Kissinger's may seem overly
cautious to many observers and analysts, it is important
to be realistic as well as prepared.
If a specific policy were to be defined by the United
States regarding this issue of Eurocommunism and the American




1. to avoid pronouncements that exaggerate or
magnify the problem and do not help the Europeans
to deal with it on their own terms,
2. to avoid ideological rigidity and have a
clear understanding of what is happening in
Europe, in order to be able to encourage and
assist democratic forces - conservative, center,
or socialist - to meet economic and social
problems within the framework of free institutions.
3. to fulfill, with our allies, the requirements
of Western defense, adapting the NATO structure
to new political situations as we have in the
past, and
4. to take advantage of what detente has done
and can do in opening the East to ideas of the
West. 9
These points are especially significant in this time
of turbulence in the international scene. The United States
is caught in a situation in Iran which is like no event in
the recent past. The most troublesome aspect is that there
is no immediate solution to the predicament involving the
American hostages. Further to the east, the dramatic action
of the Soviet Union last December in its invasion of Afghanis-
tan has provoked outcry and upheaval in all parts of the
world. Of real significance was the strong condemnation of
the Russians by the Italian Communist Party. Berlinguer and
his party have voiced opposition to this event in harsh
terms, calling the intervention a violation of the principles
of independence and sovereignty. This criticism of the
Soviet Union was shared by the Spanish Communist Party as
well, but the event seemed to split the French Communist
Party from the other two. Marchais and his French colleagues
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faithfully repeated every one of the Soviet lies about
Afghanistan. During Marchais ' visit to the Soviet Union,
he was given virtually the honors of a state visitor and
was twice received by Brezhnev at well-publicized meetings.
Such action would never have been carried out by the Italian
Communist leader, who deplored this recent Soviet act of
aggression.
As this is written, the situation in Yugoslavia is an
extremely precarious one with the Yugoslav leader, Josip
Bronz Tito on his death bed. Long a friend of Berlinguer and
the Italian Communists, President Tito and his independent-
minded form of Communism in his country have acted as a buffer
for the Italians against the Soviets. If the Soviet Union
were to move into the country after the passing of Tito, the
Italians would react immediately. As Jiri Valenta notes,
such a move on the part of the Russians would certainly
cement the unity of the Eurocommunists against the Soviet
Union.
With all these events as considerations in the overall
picture, a question remains regarding the Alliance and the
possible Communist participation in the Italian government.
"What will the rise of the Italian Communists to power por-
tend for the NATO Alliance and the United States?" A number
of possible answers to that query have been presented in
this study. Individually, they do not prove as effective
as the combination. There will be repercussions in NATO
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with Communists in cabinet-level posts. The PCI has repeated-
ly stated that it is neither interested in nor desires to
hold the portfolios of the Minister of Defense, Minister of
Foreign Affairs or Interior Minister. But, the difficulty
of evaluating these proclamations, as well as the phenomenon
of Eurocommunism, is that it has not been tested. While
the PCI leadership may say today that it does not desire
those key posts which are most sensitive and that they would
leave office if voted out by the people, who can predict
but that tomorrow may prove to be a different story?
The author does not espouse the school of thought advanced
by Henry Kissinger, who approached the subject as a major
catastrophe with no solution but a devastating one to the
national security of the United States and the Alliance.
Likewise, the subject cannot be treated casually and with
frivolity because it had never occurred; hence the Communists
cannot expect to ever hold cabinet positions or control the
government of Italy. This is a casual approach to a poten-
tially serious matter. Although the initiation of contin-
gency plans could relay an inaccurate message to our allies,
it is necessary to plan for the worst and be prepared for
the events if they should occur. While the Italian Communist
Party is presently not at the summit in popularity that it
enjoyed in the summer of 1976, one cannot rule out the possi-
bility that the people of Italy may seek the assistance of




The United States government would be unhappy to see
the participation in government of an Italian Communist
Party that favored the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Nor would it want to see a totalitarian government in Italy.
However, the Italian political process must work for itself
with possible advice from other European nations interacting
with Italy. The issue is an open one and any ultimate deci-
sion on the outcome of the political environment of Italy




MILITARY STATISTICS OF ITALY
Population: 57,200,000
Military service: Army and Air Force 12 months
Navy 18 months
Total armed forces: 365,000 (226,000 conscripts)
Estimated GNP 1978: $259 billion
Defense expenditure 1979: $6.11 billion
ARMY : 254,000 (180,000 conscripts)
3 corps headquarters
1 armored division (of 1 armored,
3 mechanical divisions (each of 1
brigade)
1 independent mechanical brigade




1 missile brigade with 1 Lance SSM, 4
620 M-47, 300 M-60A1, 730 Leopard med
2 mechanical brigades
armored, 1 mechanical
M-113, M-54 8, M-577 APC ; 1,500 guns/how,
334 105 mm pack, 155 mm, 203 mm; 100 M-44
155mm, 36 M-107 175 mm, 150 M-55 203mm SP
81 mm, 10 7 mm 12 mm mor; 6 Lance SSM; 5 7
mm RCL; Mosquito , Cobra ,
AA guns; 22 Improved
(On order: 100 Leopard tanks,
















ARMY AVIATION 20 units with 40 0-1E, 39 L-21, 80 SM-1019
light aircraft; helo incl 70 AB-47G/J, 36
AB-204B, 98 AB-205A, 140 AB-206A/A-1, 25
CH-47C, 5 A-109.
(On order: 60 A-129, 1 CH-47C helo)
RESERVES: 550,000
NAVY : 42,000, including 1,500 air arm, 1,000 Marines and
23,000 conscripts
9 submarines (1 Sauro , 4 Toti , 2 ex-Tang , 2 ex-U.S.
Guppy III)
1 Vittorio Veneto helo cruiser with 9 AB-204B/AB-212
ASW helo, Terrier/ASROC missiles
2 Andrea Doria cruisers with 4 ASW helo, Terrier SAM
GW destroyers (2 Audace with 2 ASW helo, Tartar SAM;
2 Impavido with Tartar)
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3 destroyers (1 San Giorgio (trg) , 2 Impetuoso )
12 frigates (2 Lupo with Otomat SSM, Sea Sparrow SAM,
1 ASW helo; 2 Alpino with 2 helo; 4 Bergamini with
1 helo; 4 Centauro )
8 corvettes (4 De Cristofaro , 4 Albatros )
1 Sparviero hydrofoil with Otomat SSM
4 FAC(G/T) : 2 Freccia (1 with Sea Killer SSM) , 2 Lampo
4 ex-U.S. Agile ocean, 13 ex-U.S. Adjutant and 17 Agave
coastal 8 Aragosta inshore minesweepers
2 ex-U.S. De Soto County LST, 19 ex-U.S. LCM
2 Stromboli replenishment tankers
1 Marine infantry battalion with M-113A1, LVTP-7 APC,
81mm mor, 10 6mm RCL
(On order: 3 Sauro subs, 1 helo carrier, 6 Maestrale
,
2 Lupo frigates, 6 SSM hydrofoils, 4 minehunters)
NAVAL AIR ARM 5 ASW helo squadrons with 24 SH-3D, 24
AB-204AS, 20 AB-212
(On order: 35 AB-212, 6 SH-3D)
RESERVES: 160,000
AIR FORCE 69,000 (23,000 conscripts); 311 combat aircraft
6 FGA squadrons: 1 with 18 F-104G, 3 with 54
F-104S/G, 2 with 36 G-91Y
3 light attack/recce squadrons with 54 G-91R/R1/R1A
6 AWX squadrons with 72 F-104S
2 recce squadrons with 36 F/RF-104G
2 MR squadrons with 18 Atlantic
1 ECM/recce squadron with 6 PD-808, 2 EC-119G,
EC- 4 7
3 tpt squadrons: 2 with 20 G-222, 1 with 10
C-130H
4 comms squadrons with 26 P-166M, 32 SIAI-208M,
8 PD-808, 2 DC-9, 1 DC-6; 2 HD-3D, 20 AB-47 helo
4 STAR squadrons with 8 HU-16 aircraft; 24 AB-204,
14 HH-3F helo
1 OCU with 15 TF-104G
6 trg squadrons with 70 G-91T, 100 MB-326/-339,




8 SAM groups with 9 6 Nike Hercules
(On order: 100 Tornado MRCA, 100 MB-339 trg, 24
G-222 typts)
RESERVES: 28,000
























































































PARTIAL LISTING OF U.S. /NATO INSTALLATIONS IN ITALY
COMMAND
Allied Forces Southern Europe
Allied Land Forces Southern Europe
Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe
Naval Striking and Support Forces
NATO Defense College








Naval Air Facility, Naples
Naval Air Facility, Sigonella
NAVCOMMSTA, Italy
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